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Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard v4.0.1

PCI DSS is the payment card industry's data security standard, from the PCI Security Standards Council. It applies to every organisation that handles payment card data, such as merchants and service providers. Version 4.0.1 sets 12 principal requirements, from network security to incident response, and its appendices add requirements for some kinds of entity, such as multi-tenant service providers. OSA maps the 257 numbered requirements in Requirements 1 to 12 and Appendices A1 and A2 to SP 800-53, from three independent ratings, with titles in its own words.

How this mapping was made

OSA's own analysis, from PCI DSS's text by three independent ratings. NIST's catalogue of registered crosswalks lists one mapping of PCI DSS v4.0.1, to the Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, posted by an independent developer on 23 December 2025. It has none to SP 800-53 (checked 1 November 2026). Six AI raters worked in two groups of three. One group rated the 136 requirements of Requirements 1 to 8, and the other the 121 of Requirements 9 to 12 and Appendices A1 and A2. Each rater worked on its own, from each requirement's text, applicability notes, customized approach objective and purpose, and from the control statements. None saw another's rating. OSA lists a control for a requirement where at least two of the three raters in its group named it, or where OSA's house rule for policy clauses adds it. The coverage figure is the median of the three estimates of how much of the requirement an organisation would meet by putting the listed controls in place. OSA wrote the titles, rationale and gaps after the controls were settled, from the raters' reasons and the gaps at least two of them named.

Texts

  • PCI DSS v4.0.1, Requirements and Testing Procedures (PCI Security Standards Council, June 2024, 397 pages, from its document library)
Clause Title SP 800-53 Controls
1.1.1 Policies and procedures for network security
1.1.2 Roles and duties for network security
1.2.1 Written standards for network security control rulesets
1.2.2 Change control for network connections and device settings
1.2.3 Network diagram of every CDE connection, wireless included
1.2.4 Data-flow diagram of every path account data takes
1.2.5 Business need for each allowed service, protocol and port
1.2.6 Network safeguards for insecure services and ports in use
1.2.7 Six-monthly review of network security control settings
1.2.8 Protected configuration files that match live settings
1.3.1 Deny-by-default filtering of traffic into the CDE
1.3.2 Deny-by-default filtering of traffic leaving the CDE
1.3.3 Filtering between every wireless network and the CDE
1.4.1 Network security controls at every untrusted boundary
1.4.2 Inbound rules for public services and stateful replies
1.4.3 Blocking spoofed source addresses at the network edge
1.4.4 Cardholder data stores reachable only from trusted networks
1.4.5 Keeping internal addresses and routing details private
1.5.1 Locked-down devices that reach the CDE and untrusted networks
2.1.1 Policies and procedures for secure configuration
2.1.2 Roles and duties for secure configuration
2.2.1 Hardening standards for every system component
2.2.2 Removing or securing vendor default accounts
2.2.3 Separating functions with different security needs
2.2.4 Stripping unneeded services and functions from systems
2.2.5 Justifying and protecting insecure services on systems
2.2.6 Security parameters set as tightly as operations allow
2.2.7 Encrypting every administrative session over the network
2.3.1 Replacing factory defaults on wireless equipment
2.3.2 Changing wireless keys after departures or a compromise
3.1.1 Policies and procedures for stored account data
3.1.2 Roles and duties for stored account data
3.2.1 Retention limits and secure deletion of account data
3.3.1 Erasing all SAD after authorisation, encrypted or not
3.3.1.1 Discarding full track data after authorisation
3.3.1.2 Discarding the card verification code after authorisation
3.3.1.3 Discarding the PIN and PIN block after authorisation
3.3.2 Strong encryption for SAD stored before authorisation
3.3.3 SAD held by issuers, limited to need and encrypted
3.4.1 Masking the PAN wherever it is shown
3.4.2 Stopping PAN being copied or moved in remote sessions
3.5.1 Hashing, truncating, tokenising or encrypting stored PAN
3.5.1.1 Keyed hashes of the whole PAN, with managed keys
3.5.1.2 Disk encryption as sole PAN protection, removable media only
3.5.1.3 Independent login and key handling for disk encryption
3.6.1 Protecting data keys and the keys that wrap them
3.6.1.1 Service provider's record of its cryptographic design
3.6.1.2 Approved storage forms for secret and private keys
3.6.1.3 Fewest custodians for cleartext key components
3.6.1.4 Keeping keys in as few places as possible
3.7.1 Generating strong keys for stored account data
3.7.2 Delivering keys securely to their custodians
3.7.3 Storing keys securely as part of key management
3.7.4 Changing each key when its cryptoperiod ends
3.7.5 Retiring or replacing weakened and compromised keys
3.7.6 Dual control and split knowledge in manual key handling
3.7.7 Guarding keys against unauthorised substitution
3.7.8 Key custodians' signed acceptance of their duties
3.7.9 Service provider's key guidance for customers
4.1.1 Policies and procedures for encryption in transit
4.1.2 Roles and duties for encryption in transit
4.2.1 Strong cryptography for PAN sent over public networks
4.2.1.1 Inventory of keys and certificates for PAN in transit
4.2.1.2 Wireless encryption and authentication for PAN and the CDE
4.2.2 Encrypting PAN sent by email and other messaging tools
5.1.1 Policies and procedures for malware protection
5.1.2 Roles and duties for malware protection
5.2.1 Anti-malware on every system component
5.2.2 Detecting and stopping every known kind of malware
5.2.3 Reviewing components exempted from anti-malware
5.2.3.1 Risk-based interval for reviewing exempted components
5.3.1 Automatic updates to anti-malware tools
5.3.2 Malware scans or continuous behaviour analysis
5.3.2.1 Risk-based interval for periodic malware scans
5.3.3 Scanning removable media on connection
5.3.4 Audit logs of anti-malware activity
5.3.5 Stopping users from disabling or changing anti-malware
5.4.1 Detecting and blocking phishing aimed at staff
6.1.1 Policies and procedures for secure development and change
6.1.2 Roles and duties for secure development and change
6.2.1 Secure development life cycle for bespoke and custom code
6.2.2 Yearly software security training for developers
6.2.3 Security review of code before each release
6.2.3.1 Independent manual code review and management sign-off
6.2.4 Coding techniques that defend against common attacks
6.3.1 Tracking new vulnerabilities and ranking their risk
6.3.2 Bespoke and custom code inventory with third-party components
6.3.3 Timely security patches, critical ones within a month
6.4.2 Automated defence against attacks on public web applications
6.4.3 Approving payment page scripts and checking their integrity
6.5.1 Change control for production systems
6.5.2 Rechecking PCI DSS requirements after a significant change
6.5.3 Separation of pre-production from production
6.5.4 Separate duties so only approved changes reach production
6.5.5 Keeping live PANs out of pre-production
6.5.6 Removing test data and accounts before go-live
7.1.1 Policies and procedures for access rights
7.1.2 Roles and duties for access rights
7.2.1 Access control model tied to job functions
7.2.2 Least privilege for every user, administrators included
7.2.3 Approval of each privilege by an authorised person
7.2.4 Six-monthly review of user accounts and their privileges
7.2.5 Least privilege for system and application accounts
7.2.5.1 Risk-based review of system and application account access
7.2.6 Limits on querying stored cardholder data
7.3.1 Need-to-know access control on every system component
7.3.2 Role-based permissions enforced by the access control system
7.3.3 Default deny in every access control system
8.1.1 Policies and procedures for identification and authentication
8.1.2 Roles and duties for identification and authentication
8.2.1 A unique ID for each user before any access
8.2.2 Shared, group and generic IDs as approved exceptions
8.2.3 Service provider credentials unique to each customer site
8.2.4 Approval for every change to user IDs and credentials
8.2.5 Revoking access at once when someone leaves
8.2.6 Disabling user accounts left unused for 90 days
8.2.7 Time-limited, monitored remote accounts for third parties
8.2.8 Session lock after 15 minutes of idle time
8.3.1 An authentication factor for every user and administrator
8.3.2 Encrypting authentication factors in transit and at rest
8.3.3 Confirming identity before any credential reset or change
8.3.4 Account lockout after 10 failed logon attempts
8.3.5 Unique initial and reset passwords, changed at first use
8.3.6 Password length and mix of letters and digits
8.3.7 Password history against reuse of recent passwords
8.3.8 Authentication guidance and rules given to every user
8.3.9 Password-only logons: 90-day change or risk-based access
8.3.10.1 Customer password-only logons at service providers
8.3.11 One user per token, smart card or certificate
8.4.1 Multi-factor authentication for admin access into the CDE
8.4.2 Multi-factor authentication for every user entering the CDE
8.4.3 Multi-factor authentication for remote access from outside
8.5.1 Multi-factor authentication that resists replay and bypass
8.6.1 Interactive use of system accounts by approved exception
8.6.2 Keeping system account passwords out of code and scripts
8.6.3 Change schedule and strength for system account passwords
9.1.1 Policies and procedures for physical security
9.1.2 Roles and duties for physical security
9.2.1 Controlled entry to facilities that house CDE systems
9.2.1.1 Camera or badge records of who enters sensitive areas
9.2.2 Controlling network jacks in public areas
9.2.3 Physical security of network hardware and telecom lines
9.2.4 Locking unattended consoles inside sensitive areas
9.3.1 Staff badges and entry rights for the CDE
9.3.1.1 Role-based staff entry to sensitive areas
9.3.2 Approving and escorting visitors in the CDE
9.3.3 Recovering visitor badges at departure or expiry
9.3.4 Visitor log for the building and sensitive areas
9.4.1 Securing all media that holds cardholder data
9.4.1.1 Secure storage for offline backup media
9.4.1.2 Annual security review of offline backup storage
9.4.2 Classifying media by how sensitive its data is
9.4.3 Tracked delivery of media sent off site
9.4.4 Manager approval before media leaves the site
9.4.5 Inventory of electronic media holding cardholder data
9.4.5.1 Yearly count of the electronic media inventory
9.4.6 Destroying paper records that hold cardholder data
9.4.7 Destroying or wiping retired electronic media
9.5.1 Tamper protection for card-reading POI devices
9.5.1.1 Current register of POI devices and their locations
9.5.1.2 Checking POI devices for skimmers and swapped units
9.5.1.2.1 Risk-based frequency and type of POI checks
9.5.1.3 Training POI staff to spot tampering and impostors
10.1.1 Policies and procedures for audit logging
10.1.2 Roles and duties for audit logging
10.2.1 Audit logging on every in-scope system and cardholder data store
10.2.1.1 Logging each user's access to cardholder data
10.2.1.2 Logging everything done with administrator rights
10.2.1.3 Logging every access to the audit logs themselves
10.2.1.4 Logging failed logons and other invalid access attempts
10.2.1.5 Logging changes to accounts, credentials and privileges
10.2.1.6 Logging audit logs being created, started, stopped or paused
10.2.1.7 Logging added and removed system-level objects
10.2.2 Details recorded in each audit log entry
10.3.1 Limiting who can read the audit logs
10.3.2 Guarding stored audit logs against any change
10.3.3 Prompt backup of logs to central, tamper-resistant storage
10.3.4 Integrity monitoring that alerts on changes to logs
10.4.1 Daily log review for the CDE and security-critical systems
10.4.1.1 Automated tools for audit log review
10.4.2 Regular log review for the remaining in-scope systems
10.4.2.1 Review cycle for other logs, set by targeted risk analysis
10.4.3 Following up anomalies found in log review
10.5.1 Keeping 12 months of logs, the latest three online
10.6.1 Clock synchronisation on every system
10.6.2 Central time servers fed by trusted outside sources
10.6.3 Restricting and logging changes to time settings
10.7.2 Prompt alerts when a critical security control fails
10.7.3 Recovery and follow-up after a security control fails
11.1.1 Policies and procedures for security testing
11.1.2 Roles and duties for security testing
11.2.1 Quarterly checks for rogue wireless access points
11.2.2 Wireless access point inventory with business reasons
11.3.1 Quarterly internal vulnerability scans and rescans
11.3.1.1 Risk-based fixing of lower-ranked vulnerabilities
11.3.1.2 Authenticated internal vulnerability scanning
11.3.1.3 Internal scanning after each significant change
11.3.2 Quarterly external scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor
11.3.2.1 External scanning after each significant change
11.4.1 Penetration testing methodology and what it covers
11.4.2 Internal penetration tests, yearly and after major changes
11.4.3 External penetration tests, yearly and after major changes
11.4.4 Fixing and retesting penetration test findings
11.4.5 Yearly penetration tests of CDE segmentation
11.4.6 Six-monthly segmentation tests for service providers
11.4.7 Multi-tenant providers' support for customer penetration tests
11.5.1 Intrusion detection and prevention for CDE traffic
11.5.1.1 Service providers' detection of covert malware channels
11.5.2 Weekly integrity checks on critical files
11.6.1 Detecting tampering with payment page scripts and headers
12.1.1 Information security policy shared with staff and partners
12.1.2 Yearly review and update of the security policy
12.1.3 Security duties for all staff and their acknowledgement
12.1.4 An executive in charge of information security
12.2.1 Acceptable use rules for end-user technology
12.3.1 Targeted risk analysis for frequencies the organisation sets
12.3.2 Targeted risk analysis for the customised approach
12.3.3 Inventory and yearly review of cipher suites and protocols
12.3.4 Yearly review of vendor support for technology in use
12.4.1 Executive accountability for PCI DSS compliance
12.4.2 Quarterly checks that staff follow security procedures
12.4.2.1 Recording the quarterly checks and their sign-off
12.5.1 Inventory of in-scope system components
12.5.2 Confirming PCI DSS scope every year
12.5.2.1 Confirming PCI DSS scope every six months
12.5.3 Scope and control review after a reorganisation
12.6.1 Formal security awareness programme for all staff
12.6.2 Yearly review and refresh of awareness content
12.6.3 Awareness training at hire and yearly, with policy sign-off
12.6.3.1 Teaching staff to spot phishing and social engineering
12.6.3.2 Acceptable use rules in awareness training
12.7.1 Background checks before hiring staff with CDE access
12.8.1 Inventory of service providers that touch account data
12.8.2 Contracts where service providers accept responsibility for data
12.8.3 Due diligence before taking on a service provider
12.8.4 Yearly check of each service provider's PCI DSS status
12.8.5 Responsibility split for PCI DSS requirements, per provider
12.9.1 Service provider's written acknowledgement to customers
12.9.2 Service provider's answers to customer compliance requests
12.10.1 Incident response plan and what it covers
12.10.2 Yearly incident response plan review and full test
12.10.3 Named incident responders on call around the clock
12.10.4 Training incident responders in their duties
12.10.4.1 Responder training frequency set by targeted risk analysis
12.10.5 Alert handling in the incident response plan
12.10.6 Updating the response plan from lessons and industry change
12.10.7 Responding when stored PAN turns up somewhere unexpected
A1.1.1 Two-way separation of provider and customer environments
A1.1.2 Customer-to-customer separation of data and CDE
A1.1.3 Keeping each customer within its allocated resources
A1.1.4 Penetration tests of customer separation every six months
A1.2.1 Audit logs for each customer, readable by that customer
A1.2.2 Forensic investigation support for every customer
A1.2.3 Customer reporting channel for incidents and vulnerabilities
A2.1.1 Known-exploit check for POI terminals on SSL or early TLS
A2.1.2 Service provider's plan to retire SSL and early TLS
A2.1.3 Secure connection option for customers' POI terminals