← Frameworks / BSI C5:2026 / Coverage Analysis

BSI Cloud Computing Compliance Criteria Catalogue (C5:2026) — SP 800-53 Coverage

How well do NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 controls address each BSI C5:2026 requirement? This analysis maps from framework clauses back to SP 800-53, with expert coverage weightings and gap identification.

Coverage Distribution
Full (85-100%): 13 Substantial (65-84%): 98 Partial (40-64%): 41 Weak (1-39%): 12 None (0%): 4

Clause-by-Clause Analysis

Sorted by clause
OIS-01 An ISO 27001 management system that covers the cloud service

Rationale

PM-01 has the provider write an organisation-wide security programme plan that sets out its requirements and assigns roles and responsibilities. A senior official approves the plan, and the provider reviews and updates it on a set cycle, which gives the documented core of a management system. PL-02 has the security plan define the system's components and its links to other systems, and describe the controls in place with the reasons for any tailoring. That records the scope and boundaries of the service and serves as a statement of applicability. CA-02 has the controls assessed on a set cycle, and CA-02(01) uses independent assessors, which comes part of the way to a certification audit.

Gaps

C5 asks for an ISMS that meets ISO/IEC 27001, with the provider's context and the results of the last management review on record. Add both to the programme plan. The additional criteria ask for a valid certificate from an accredited certification body.

Mapped Controls

OIS-02 A top-level security policy set by senior management

Rationale

This criterion lists PM-01 with the -01 control of every other family except PT, as OSA does for clauses that ask for security policies in general. PM-01 gives an organisation-wide security programme plan with assigned roles and management commitment, approved by a senior official who is accountable for the risk. Each -01 control adds a documented policy for its own family that covers purpose, scope, roles and management commitment, shared with defined roles and reviewed on a set cycle. Together they give a top-level policy approved by senior management, with a policy for each area beneath it.

Gaps

C5 asks top management to share the policy with customers as well as with the provider's own and external staff. Extend the distribution under PM-01 to customers. C5 also asks the policy to state security objectives with a target level of security, and the strategy for reaching them.

OIS-03 Shared responsibility model with customers

Rationale

CA-03 has the provider manage each information exchange through agreements, such as service level or user agreements. Each agreement records the interface, the security requirements, the controls and the responsibilities of each side, and the provider reviews it on a set cycle. PL-02 has the security plan describe dependencies on and connections to other systems, and the provider tells defined roles about later changes to the plan. SA-05 gives customers user documentation on the security functions open to them and on their own part in keeping the service secure. SA-09 defines and documents oversight and user roles for the external services the provider relies on.

Gaps

C5 asks for one documented model that splits the handling of vulnerabilities and incidents between the provider and its customers. Set out that split in the CA-03 agreements and the SA-05 user documentation. Announce changes to the model early enough for customers to adapt before they take effect.

OIS-04 Separating conflicting duties on the basis of risk

Rationale

AC-05 has the provider identify and document the duties that need separating and define access rights that support the separation, which gives the list of conflicts. AC-02 sets prerequisites and criteria for group and role membership and reviews accounts on a set cycle, so the separation holds whenever roles are assigned or changed. CM-05 defines and enforces access restrictions for changes to the system, and CM-05(05) limits privileges in production and operation, which helps keep development apart from operations. Where duties stay combined, AU-06 reviews audit records for inappropriate or unusual activity and reports the findings.

Gaps

C5 bases the separation on a risk assessment that covers role administration, the release of changes, risk management and operations. Run that assessment and record the resulting measures in the risk treatment plan. The additional criteria ask the provider to monitor the separation measures and fix deviations promptly.

OIS-05 Gathering threat intelligence and feeding it into risk management

Rationale

PM-16 sets up a threat awareness programme that shares threat intelligence across organisations. SI-05 has the provider receive security alerts and advisories from outside bodies on an ongoing basis and issue internal ones where needed. RA-03 identifies threats to the system as part of the risk assessment. RA-03(02) uses all-source intelligence and RA-03(03) adds dynamic threat awareness, which bring the intelligence into risk management.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to correlate the threat information with its own assets and processes to judge the likely impact. Add that step to the RA-03 assessment, and include internal sources such as the provider's own security monitoring.

Mapped Controls

OIS-06 Keeping in touch with Germany's national cyber bodies

Rationale

PM-15 has the provider set up and keep contact with chosen groups in the security community to share current information on threats and incidents. SI-05 has it receive security alerts and advisories from defined outside bodies on an ongoing basis. IR-06 has it report incident information to the authorities it names. With the national centre and the CERT association named as those bodies, these controls give the contact C5 asks for.

Gaps

C5 names the BSI's CERT association and the National IT Situation Centre, and applies when German public sector bodies use the service. Name both as the outside bodies in these controls whenever the service has such customers.

Mapped Controls

OIS-07 A documented, repeatable method for managing risk

Rationale

RA-01 gives a documented risk assessment policy with procedures to carry it out, shared with defined roles and reviewed on a set cycle. PM-09 sets one strategy for managing security risk and applies it consistently across the organisation, which gives a common basis for comparing results. PM-28 records the assumptions, constraints, priorities and risk tolerance that serve as criteria for accepting and ranking risks. RA-03 identifies threats and vulnerabilities and judges the likelihood and size of harm, with the results documented. RA-07 responds to findings in line with the risk tolerance, which covers the treatment step.

Gaps

C5 asks for a method that gives comparable and reproducible results, with a named owner for each risk who approves its treatment and accepts the residual risk. Assign those owners in the RA-01 procedures. Have the management level responsible for the service's security review the assessment and the status of treatment plans.

OIS-08 Yearly and event-driven risk assessment of the service

Rationale

RA-01 provides the documented risk assessment policy and procedures that C5 asks the provider to put in place. RA-03 has the provider document risk assessments and share the results with defined roles. It updates them on a set cycle or after significant changes, and RA-03(01) adds supply chain risk, which covers dependence on service organisations. CA-07 continuous monitoring, with CA-07(04) risk monitoring, follows how risks develop. PM-09 applies one security risk strategy across the organisation, and PM-29 appoints a senior official who aligns risk management with strategic planning, which meets the additional criterion on enterprise risk.

Gaps

C5 lists risk sources to weigh, such as tenant separation, interfaces open to public networks, key management and insider threats. Add them to the RA-03 assessment and run it at least once a year. Have risk owners review the analysis and treatment each year, and give customers and other outside parties the results that concern them.

OIS-09 Planning and tracking the treatment of risks

Rationale

CA-05 has the provider keep a plan of action and milestones for remedying weaknesses and known vulnerabilities, updated from assessments and monitoring. PM-04 makes sure those plans record the remedial actions and are reported as required, and checks them against the risk strategy and organisation-wide priorities. RA-07 has the provider respond to findings in line with its risk tolerance, which brings risk down to a level that can be accepted. SA-05 user documentation sets out the users' part in keeping the service secure, which is where shared risks meet the customer's own controls.

Gaps

C5 asks risk owners to accept the residual risk and to review the chosen treatment options whenever the risk assessment changes. Add both steps to the CA-05 process. Decide, from contracts and the law, which outside parties receive information on the treatment plan and how much.

OIS-10 Assessing security risk in projects that affect the service

Rationale

SA-03 has the provider manage the system through a development life cycle that builds in security, with security roles defined. It also brings the organisation's risk management process into the life cycle activities. RA-03 has the provider update the risk assessment when the system or its environment changes significantly, which covers the risks a project brings.

Gaps

C5 covers every project that may affect the service, including organisational changes outside system development. Bring those projects under the RA-03 assessment and treat the risks it finds.

Mapped Controls

SP-01 One consistent, approved set of security policies

Rationale

This criterion lists PM-01 with the -01 control of every other family except PT, as OSA does for clauses that ask for security policies in general. PM-01 gives the organisation-wide programme plan, approved by a senior official, from which the other policies follow. Each -01 control has the provider document a policy for its family that covers purpose, scope, roles and responsibilities, with procedures to carry it out. The provider shares each one with defined roles and names an official to manage it.

Gaps

C5 asks every policy to derive from the top-level policy and follow one structure, with version control and approval by top management or an authorised body. Add these rules to the -01 controls. In each policy, also name the qualifications and stand-ins for its roles, and its dependencies on customers and subservice organisations.

SP-02 Yearly expert review of security policies, approved before use

Rationale

This criterion lists PM-01 with the -01 control of every other family except PT, as OSA does for clauses that ask for security policies in general. Each -01 control has the provider review and update its family's policy and procedures on a set cycle and after defined events. PM-01 has a senior official approve the programme plan, which the provider also reviews and updates on a set cycle and after defined events. Together they keep the whole policy set under regular and event-driven review.

Gaps

C5 asks subject matter experts to review each policy at least once a year and after significant changes to the service, weighing organisational and technical changes along with new legal duties. Set that cycle and those inputs in each -01 control. Have the right level of management approve revised policies before they take effect.

SP-03 A risk-approved register of policy exceptions

Rationale

CM-06 has the provider record and approve any departure from its set configuration settings, which handles technical exceptions. CA-05 keeps a plan of action and milestones for known weaknesses and updates it on a set cycle, which tracks open exceptions and their remediation. RA-07 has the provider respond to findings in line with its risk tolerance, which gives the risk decision each exception needs.

Gaps

C5 asks for one register of every exception to a security policy, with its controls and a set period of validity. Keep that register and review it at least once a year, weighing the combined risk of all the exceptions. Allow only exceptions that leave every applicable C5 criterion met, and watch the register so approvals stay current, as the additional criteria ask.

Mapped Controls

HR-01 Screening staff who can reach production systems and data

Rationale

PS-02 gives every position a risk designation with screening criteria for the people who fill it, and reviews the designations on a set cycle, which classifies sensitive roles by risk. PS-03 screens people before they get access and rescreens them under conditions and at a frequency the provider sets, which covers checks before hiring and before a move into a riskier role. PS-05 reviews and adjusts access when people are reassigned or transferred. PS-07 sets personnel security requirements for external providers and has them follow the provider's policies, which extends the checks to external staff. PS-01 gives the personnel security policy, where the positions that need regular checks are defined.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to name the roles that can reach customer data or production components. C5 has the provider check competence as well as integrity for those roles, with measures such as identity papers, CVs, degrees, a police certificate and exposure to blackmail where local law allows. Record the roles and set those checks as screening criteria in PS-02, then run them under PS-03.

HR-02 Security duties written into staff contracts

Rationale

PL-04 gives each person who needs access rules that set out their duties and expected behaviour, and takes a documented acknowledgement before access is granted. PS-06 has people sign access agreements, such as non-disclosure and acceptable use agreements, before they get access, and sign again after updates. PS-07 has external providers follow the provider's personnel security policies and procedures, which binds external staff to the same rules.

Gaps

C5 asks for employment terms that reflect the law and bind staff to a code of ethics as well as the security policy. Add both to the contracts and to the PL-04 rules. Make the non-disclosure clause in PS-06 cover all information staff gain or create in the service, including anonymised information.

Mapped Controls

HR-03 Role-based security awareness and training for all staff

Rationale

AT-02 gives all users, contractors included, security literacy training when they start and on a set cycle, updated with lessons from incidents. AT-02(06) covers the current cyber threat environment. AT-03 adds role-based training before access and when systems change, and IR-02 gives users incident response training that fits their roles. AT-04 documents and monitors training and keeps individual records, which tracks completion, and AT-06 reports training results to defined staff, which supports evaluating the programme.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to measure learning outcomes for each target group, with quantitative and qualitative measures. Add those measures to the AT-06 feedback. Follow up promptly on any missed training that the AT-04 records show.

HR-04 A documented disciplinary process for policy breaches

Rationale

PS-08 runs a formal sanctions process for people who break security policies and procedures. When a sanction starts, it tells defined roles who is sanctioned and why, which leaves a record of each use. PS-01 gives a personnel security policy and procedures consistent with applicable law, where the disciplinary process is set down.

Gaps

C5 asks the process to confirm that a breach took place and to weigh its severity and impact before acting. Add both steps to the PS-08 process. Tell all internal and external staff in advance what measures they may face.

Mapped Controls

HR-05 Security duties that continue after leaving or changing jobs

Rationale

PS-04 holds exit interviews that cover the security topics the provider sets, and PS-04(01) adds the post-employment requirements that departing staff are told about. PS-06(03) does the same through the access agreements under PS-06, which make people aware of duties that continue after they leave.

Gaps

C5 covers staff who change roles as well as those who leave. Tell both groups which duties stay in place, and state in the access agreements how long each one lasts.

Mapped Controls

HR-06 Confidentiality agreements for staff and service organisations

Rationale

PS-06 has the provider write access agreements, such as non-disclosure agreements, and review and update them on a set cycle. People sign them before they get access and sign again when the agreements change, which gives the renewed confirmation C5 asks for. PS-07 sets personnel security requirements for external providers and has them follow the provider's policies, which brings service organisations under the confidentiality terms.

Gaps

C5 bases the agreements on the provider's documented needs for protecting confidential information, with a review of those needs every year and after significant changes. Have service organisations accept the agreement when they sign the contract. Where staff or a service organisation decline an update, assess the resulting risk.

Mapped Controls

HR-07 Rules for protecting information when staff work remotely

Rationale

AC-01 and PE-01 give documented and shared policies with procedures for access control and physical protection, which hold the rules for staff working off site. AC-17 documents the restrictions and connection requirements for each type of remote access, and AC-17(02) protects remote sessions with encryption. AC-19 sets configuration and connection requirements for the provider's mobile devices, also outside controlled areas, which covers approved equipment. AC-20 sets terms for external systems or bans them, and AC-20(03) restricts the use of systems owned by others, which covers personal devices. PE-17 documents the alternate work sites staff may use and the controls that apply there, with a way to reach security staff about incidents.

Gaps

C5 asks for guidance to staff on handling and storing sensitive information at home and in public places. Add it to the controls set for alternate work sites in PE-17.

HR-08 Putting the remote working rules into practice

Rationale

AC-17 authorises each type of remote access before connections are allowed, with AC-17(01) monitoring and controlling it and AC-17(02) encrypting it. AC-19 applies configuration requirements to the provider's mobile devices and authorises their connection, and AC-19(05) adds full device or container encryption. AC-20 enforces the terms for external systems or bans them, which keeps unmanaged devices out. PE-17 applies defined controls at alternate work sites and assesses how well they work.

Gaps

C5 expects protection on the endpoints staff use away from the office. Add it to the PE-17 controls, and check that the measures let staff follow the remote working policy in practice.

AM-01 Documented rules for identifying and tracking service assets

Rationale

CM-01 gives a documented and shared configuration management policy with procedures, which hold the asset framework. CM-08 has the provider document an inventory of system components at the level of detail needed for tracking and reporting, which sets how assets are inventoried. CM-09 sets a configuration management plan with a process for identifying configuration items through the development life cycle and placing them under management. RA-02 categorises the system and the information it handles, with the reasons on record, which gives the scheme for protection needs.

Gaps

C5 asks the framework to define asset types, keeping hardware apart from software, with a life cycle for each type. Add both to the CM-09 plan. The additional criterion asks the provider to use asset data in logging and monitoring to judge the impact of events and to inform affected customers.

AM-02 Keeping a complete, current inventory of assets

Rationale

CM-08 keeps an accurate inventory that holds every component once, with the information needed for accountability, and the provider reviews and updates it on a set cycle. CM-08(01) and CM-08(02) keep it current as components come and go, using automation, and CM-08(03) detects unauthorised components. CM-12 documents the users who can reach the components where defined information is processed and stored. AC-02 records each account's authorised users with their group and role membership and their access rights.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to log every change to an asset's record. C5 also asks each asset's record to hold the information the risk procedure needs and the measures taken against those risks. Add both to the CM-08 inventory.

Mapped Controls

AM-03 Details recorded for each hardware item

Rationale

CM-08 has each inventory entry hold the information the provider needs for component accountability, at a level of detail fit for tracking. CM-08(04) adds accountability information, such as who is responsible for each component, and CM-08(08) tracks location automatically.

Gaps

C5 asks each hardware entry to show where the asset stands in its life cycle and to carry the information needed for its risk assessment. Add both fields to the CM-08 inventory.

Mapped Controls

AM-04 A full record of the software the service uses

Rationale

CM-08 inventories every system component, software included, at a level of detail fit for tracking and with the information needed for accountability. The provider reviews and updates the inventory on a set cycle, which identifies each software asset and keeps the record current.

Gaps

C5 asks each software entry to show which other assets use it. The additional criterion adds how long the supplier will provide security updates, where the supplier has said so. Record both in the CM-08 inventory.

Mapped Controls

AM-05 Rules for using assets securely through their life cycle

Rationale

CM-01, MA-01, MP-01, PE-01, SA-01 and SI-01 give documented and shared policies with procedures for configuration, maintenance, media, physical protection, acquisition and system integrity, which hold the asset rules across the life cycle. CM-06 sets restrictive configuration settings for components and approves any departures, which covers the secure set-up of security mechanisms. CM-11 governs software that users install, and MP-07 restricts or bans defined media types and bans ownerless portable storage. SA-22 replaces components once their supplier stops support, or arranges other support, which deals with software whose security patches have ended.

Gaps

C5 asks the policy to set approval steps for each stage of an asset's life, from acquisition to disposal, and rules for disabling or wiping assets remotely. Add both to the asset rules under CM-01 and MP-01.

AM-06 Approving new hardware before it enters production

Rationale

CM-03 reviews proposed changes and approves or rejects them with explicit regard to security impact analyses, and records the decisions, which gives an approval step for bringing hardware into production. CM-04 analyses each change for its security impact before it is made, and CM-04(02) checks afterwards that the affected controls work as intended. CM-06 sets and applies secure configuration settings for components, which is what the provider checks before approval.

Gaps

C5 asks for approval only after a check of the hardware's error handling, logging, encryption and access mechanisms against its intended use. List those checks in the CM-03 approval step, and treat the risks found before approval is given.

Mapped Controls

AM-07 Retiring hardware with secure deletion or destruction

Rationale

MP-01 gives documented media protection procedures, which hold the steps for retiring hardware that stores data. MP-06 sanitises media before they are disposed of or reused, with mechanisms as strong as the information's classification requires. MP-06(01) adds review, approval, tracking and verification of that sanitisation. SR-12 disposes of defined data and components with defined techniques, which covers destroying the media.

Gaps

C5 asks for a decommissioning procedure in its own right, with approval by authorised staff before the hardware is retired. Write it into the MP-01 procedures.

Mapped Controls

AM-08 Staff commitments on handling and returning assets

Rationale

PL-04 gives people rules for using information and systems and takes a documented acknowledgement before access, which proves their commitment. PS-06 has them sign access agreements, such as acceptable use agreements, before they get access. On termination, PS-04 retrieves all security-related property, disables system access within a set time and revokes credentials, which covers the return of assets and the removal of access.

Gaps

C5 uses a risk assessment to decide which assets need a provable commitment, namely those where loss or unauthorised access could harm the service. Run that assessment, and keep proof that each asset handed out came back.

Mapped Controls

AM-09 Classifying assets by the protection needs of their data

Rationale

RA-02 categorises the system and the information it handles, with the reasons recorded and the decision approved, which classifies assets by the protection needs of their data. RA-02(01) adds a finer ranking within each impact level. MP-03 marks media with distribution limits and handling caveats, and PE-22 marks hardware components with the impact or classification level of the information they may handle. IA-03 identifies and authenticates defined devices uniquely before a connection is made, which meets the additional criterion on device identity.

Gaps

C5 asks for a review of classification levels at least once a year and after significant changes, with a schema that also covers authenticity and matches the recovery objectives. Add both to the RA-02 categorisation. The additional criteria ask monitoring to rank events by the protection need of the asset involved.

AM-10 Storing idle hardware safely until it is needed

Rationale

MP-04 keeps defined media under physical control and stores them securely in controlled areas until they are destroyed or sanitised, which protects idle hardware that holds data. PE-18 places system components to limit damage from hazards and the chance of unauthorised access. MP-01 and PE-01 give documented media and physical protection procedures, which can hold the procedure for hardware on hold.

Gaps

C5 asks for a documented procedure, based on a risk assessment, for hardware that is temporarily out of use. Write it into the MP-01 and PE-01 procedures.

AM-11 Moving production hardware off site under control

Rationale

PE-16 authorises and controls components entering and leaving the facility and keeps records of them. MA-02 has defined roles approve explicitly any removal of components for off-site repair or replacement. MP-05 protects media in transport outside controlled areas, keeps accountability, documents the transport and limits it to authorised staff, and MP-05(03) adds custodians for the chain of custody. MP-01 and PE-01 give the documented procedures for these moves.

Gaps

C5 asks for checks on receipt and protection against tampering in transit, with the transfer method chosen on the basis of a risk assessment. Add these to the MP-05 transport controls.

AM-12 Securing portable storage and the devices staff use

Rationale

AC-01 and MP-01 give the documented policies that hold the rules for endpoints and removable media, and MP-07 restricts or bans defined media types and bans ownerless portable storage. SC-28(01) encrypts stored information on endpoints and media under SC-28, AC-19(05) encrypts the provider's mobile devices under AC-19, and SI-03 scans files from external sources at endpoints as they are opened or run. CM-07 restricts defined functions, such as running programs automatically from removable storage, and AC-11 locks an idle device until the user signs in again. MP-05 protects media in transport outside controlled areas, including equipment on its way to disposal, and MP-06 sanitises media before they leave the provider's control or are reused. PL-04 sets users' duties for using systems securely, which covers devices and media. AC-20 sets terms for third-party systems, and SC-07(12) and SC-07(10) add host-based protection and exfiltration prevention under SC-07 for the additional criteria.

Gaps

C5 bases the endpoint and media measures on a risk assessment. Run it and record the results in the AC-01 and MP-01 procedures. The additional criteria also ask for remote location tracking on managed mobile devices.

PS-01 Site security requirements for data centres and premises

Rationale

PE-01 gives a documented and shared physical and environmental protection policy with procedures, which records the security requirements for premises. PE-23 plans the facility's location with physical and environmental hazards in mind and weighs those hazards for existing sites, which addresses faults in planning. PE-11 provides an uninterruptible power supply for an orderly shutdown or a move to long-term alternate power, and PE-11(01) and PE-11(02) add an alternate power supply. SA-09 has the operators of external services meet the provider's security requirements and use defined controls, and monitors their compliance, which covers data centres run by service organisations.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to define at least a sensitive and a public security area, and to set data centre requirements against each hazard it lists. Write both into the PE-01 policy, with the longest utility outage each facility can tolerate under the service level agreement. The additional criteria set design figures for self-sufficient running, such as 72 hours on the site's own power supply.

PS-02 Running the service from at least two separate sites

Rationale

SC-36 spreads defined processing and storage components across several physical locations, which supports running the service from more than one site. CP-07 sets up an alternate processing site with controls equal to those at the primary site, able to resume operations within the recovery objectives. CP-07(01) keeps that site far enough from the primary to reduce exposure to the same threats. CP-04 tests the contingency plan on a set cycle, and CP-04(02) tests the alternate site, which checks that the redundancy works.

Gaps

C5 asks for the service to run from at least two sites that meet the provider's security requirements, with redundancy designed to meet the availability in the service level agreement. Size the CP-07 and SC-36 arrangements to that figure. The additional criteria ask for a third site that keeps the service running if two fail together.

Mapped Controls

PS-03 A solid building shell that resists and detects intrusion

Rationale

PE-03 enforces access authorisations at entry and exit points with access control systems or guards. PE-03(03) adds continuous guards and PE-03(07) adds physical barriers. PE-06 monitors physical access to detect and respond to incidents, and PE-06(01) and PE-06(03) add intrusion alarms and video surveillance. AT-03 role-based training, with AT-03(02) on physical security controls, prepares data centre staff to respond to intrusion attempts.

Gaps

C5 asks for a solid building shell whose outer elements together hold off a break-in for at least ten minutes, with walls and locks to match. Specify that resistance for each site, and add compensating measures where the elements fall short.

Mapped Controls

PS-04 Controlling and logging entry to sites and secure areas

Rationale

PE-02 keeps an approved list of people allowed into the facility, issues credentials, reviews the list and removes people once their need for access ends. PE-02(01) grants access by position or role, which supports least privilege. PE-03 checks each person's authorisation before entry, controls entry and exit with access control systems, keeps access logs and escorts visitors. PE-06 monitors physical access and reviews the logs, which lets the provider check that only authorised people entered, and PE-08 keeps and reviews visitor records and reports anomalies. PE-01 gives the documented policy and procedures for these rules.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to revoke physical access left unused for two months and to require multi-factor authentication for areas hosting customer data systems. Add both to the PE-02 and PE-03 rules. C5 also asks for warning signs at non-public areas and a review after every emergency override of access control.

PS-05 Protecting the sites from environmental hazards

Rationale

PE-13 keeps fire detection and suppression systems running on an independent energy source. PE-13(01) and PE-13(02) activate them automatically and send notifications, and PE-13(04) adds inspections. PE-10 lets staff shut off power to components in an emergency, which supports cutting power when fire is detected. PE-09 protects power equipment and cabling from damage, and PE-09(02) adds automatic voltage controls against overvoltage. PE-15 protects the system from water leaks with working shutoff valves, and PE-23 plans the site with physical and environmental hazards in mind, which covers flood levels.

Gaps

C5 asks for fire sections whose structural parts resist fire for at least 90 minutes, or equivalent measures, and for protection against lightning and heavy rain. Specify these for each site. C5 also asks for regular fire drills: schedule them alongside the PE-13 inspections.

PS-06 Keeping power and other supply facilities running

Rationale

PE-11 provides an uninterruptible power supply for an orderly shutdown or a move to long-term alternate power, and PE-11(01) and PE-11(02) add an alternate power supply. PE-09 protects power equipment and cabling from damage, with PE-09(01) adding redundant cabling, and PE-04 controls physical access to distribution and transmission lines. CP-08 sets up alternate telecommunications services, with CP-08(02) addressing single points of failure and CP-08(03) separating the primary and alternate providers. PE-14 keeps temperature and humidity within set levels, which the cooling supply must achieve, and MA-02 schedules and documents maintenance in line with manufacturer specifications.

Gaps

C5 asks for N+1 redundancy in power and cooling, with the backup power tested at least once a year. Have qualified staff inspect distributors and cabling at least every two years for tampering and for agreement with the documentation. The additional criteria size the cooling for five days of the hottest expected weather.

PS-07 Monitoring utilities and room conditions with alarms

Rationale

PE-14 keeps environmental levels such as temperature and humidity within set limits and monitors them on a set cycle. PE-14(01) adds automatic controls and PE-14(02) raises alarms and notifications when levels go out of range. PE-15(01) detects water near the system and alerts staff by automated means, which covers leak alarms under PE-15.

Gaps

C5 also asks the provider to monitor the operating parameters of the utilities, such as the power supply and the uninterruptible power systems. Bring them into the same monitoring and alarms as PE-14.

Mapped Controls

PS-08 Security rules for office workplaces

Rationale

PE-01 gives the documented physical protection policy that holds the office requirements. PE-03 enforces access authorisations at entry points with access control systems or guards, and PE-06 monitors physical access, with PE-06(01) and PE-06(03) adding intrusion alarms and video surveillance. AC-11 locks idle devices and AC-11(01) hides the screen content, while MP-04 keeps media, paper included, under control and stored securely. MP-06 sanitises media before disposal, which covers destroying unneeded documents, and AC-20 lets the provider ban defined types of external systems, such as third-party equipment.

Gaps

C5 asks for privacy screens on workstations. C5 also bases the office requirements on a risk assessment and lets the provider scale them for rented offices. Record that assessment and the resulting requirements in the PE-01 policy.

OPS-01 Planning staff and system capacity ahead of demand

Rationale

CP-02(02) adds capacity planning to the contingency plan under CP-02, so that the needed capacity exists during contingency operations. SC-06 allocates defined resources by priority or quota, which helps keep agreed resources available to customers when capacity runs short.

Gaps

C5 asks for a standing procedure that plans staff and system capacity for normal operations and forecasts demand from usage trends. Set one up, and use the forecasts with the service level agreement when planning provisioning.

Mapped Controls

OPS-02 Watching capacity so customers get what was agreed

Rationale

SC-05(03) adds detection and monitoring to the denial-of-service protection of SC-05, which has the provider watch defined system resources to see whether enough exist. SC-06 allocates defined resources by priority or quota, which helps deliver resources as agreed with each customer.

Gaps

C5 asks for procedures to provision and release resources and to check that the service level agreements are met. Set them up, and report to customers any capacity shortfall that breaches the contract. The additional criterion offers customers a self-service view of capacity and availability.

Mapped Controls

OPS-03 Customer control over allocated resources
0%

Rationale

Gaps

SP 800-53 sets controls for an organisation's own systems, while this criterion concerns a feature the provider offers its customers: the means to steer and monitor the resources allocated to them. C5 also asks the provider to tell customers about significant security changes to those resources. Build both into the service and its customer documentation.

OPS-04 Rules for protecting systems and devices from malware

Rationale

SI-01 gives a documented and shared system and information integrity policy with procedures, which holds the malware rules. SI-03 places malicious code protection at system entry and exit points and updates it automatically. It runs periodic scans of the system and real-time scans of files from external sources at endpoints and network entry points, which covers staff devices as well as incoming traffic.

Gaps

C5 also asks the policy to cover the protection mechanisms built into each system. Name them in the SI-01 procedures.

Mapped Controls

OPS-05 Running and updating malware protection in production

Rationale

SI-03 puts malicious code protection on the system and updates it automatically as new releases appear. It alerts defined staff when it finds malicious code. CM-06 monitors and controls changes to configuration settings, and CM-06(01) and CM-06(02) verify the settings automatically and respond to unauthorised changes, which covers the additional criteria on monitoring the protection set-up. AU-06 reviews and analyses records, such as scan results, on a set cycle and reports the findings to defined roles.

Gaps

C5 asks for malware definitions to be updated at least daily, or as often as the vendor allows under the additional criteria. Set that frequency in SI-03. The additional criteria also ask the provider to secure the customer and administration consoles against malware.

Mapped Controls

OPS-06 Backup and restore rules matched to recovery objectives

Rationale

CP-01 gives a documented and shared contingency planning policy with procedures, which holds the backup and restore rules. CP-09 backs up information at a frequency that fits the recovery time and recovery point objectives and protects the backup information. CP-09(08) encrypts the backups. CP-10 recovers and rebuilds the system to a known state within a time that fits the recovery objectives, which covers restores.

Gaps

C5 sets the scope and retention of backups by the customer contracts as well as by the recovery objectives. Align the CP-09 schedule with those contracts. Where the contract provides for it, handle restores and restore tests that customers request.

Mapped Controls

OPS-07 Watching backup runs and fixing failures

Rationale

CP-09 runs backups at the frequency the recovery objectives set, and CP-09(01) tests the backups for reliability and integrity, which partly confirms that they ran as planned. IR-04 gives an incident handling capability that covers detection, analysis, containment and recovery, which covers investigating and fixing failed backups.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to monitor every backup run against the backup policy, and to investigate and fix failures in time to meet customer obligations. Set up that monitoring alongside CP-09. The additional criterion gives customers backup logs or summaries in a self-service portal.

Mapped Controls

OPS-08 Testing restores against recovery objectives each year

Rationale

CP-04 tests the contingency plan on a set cycle and starts corrective action where the results call for it. CP-04(04) tests full recovery and reconstitution, and CP-04(01) coordinates the tests with related plans. CP-09(01) tests backups for reliability and integrity, and CP-09(02) restores samples during testing under CP-09. SA-03(02) controls the use of live data in preproduction environments under SA-03, which supports restoring customer data only where production access rules apply.

Gaps

C5 asks for restore tests at least once a year, judged against the contract terms and the recovery time and point objectives. Record each test in full, including how the restored data was then securely deleted. The additional criteria ask the provider to share the results with customers who request them.

Mapped Controls

OPS-09 Keeping protected backups at a distant second site

Rationale

CP-06 sets up an alternate storage site with controls equal to those at the primary site, and CP-06(01) keeps it far enough from the primary site to reduce shared threats. CP-09 protects backup information, with CP-09(05) transferring backups to the alternate site and CP-09(08) encrypting them. MP-05 protects backup media carried outside controlled areas, and SC-08(01) encrypts backups sent over a network under SC-08.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to choose the distance between sites by weighing recovery times against the impact a disaster could have on both. Record that reasoning when siting the CP-06 storage site.

OPS-10 A policy for event logging and system monitoring

Rationale

AU-01 and SI-01 give documented and shared policies with procedures for logging and for system integrity, which set roles and follow applicable law. AU-02 defines which event types to log, with the reasons they suffice for investigating incidents, and AU-12 lets defined roles choose what each component logs, with AU-12(03) letting authorised staff change the logging. AU-11 keeps audit records for a set period to support investigations and meet retention rules, and AU-16 sets methods for passing audit information to outside organisations, such as customers. AU-08 has time stamps generated from internal clocks in Coordinated Universal Time or with a stated offset, and SC-45 synchronises system clocks, with SC-45(01) and SC-45(02) using a primary and a secondary authoritative time source. SI-04 monitors the system against defined objectives and calls for a legal opinion on that monitoring.

Gaps

C5 asks the policy to state the purpose of each log and the criteria that make a time source reliable. Add both to the AU-01 procedures.

OPS-11 Using derived and account data only to run the service

Rationale

AU-01 and PT-01 give documented policies with procedures for audit records and for processing personal data, which govern how derived and account data are handled. PT-03 documents the purposes for processing personal data and limits processing to purposes compatible with them, which keeps use to running the service. AU-09 protects audit information against unauthorised access and tampering, AU-11 keeps records for a set period, and SI-12(03) disposes of information under SI-12 once the retention period ends. AU-03(03) limits the personal data in audit records, and SI-19 removes defined personal data elements from datasets and checks how well the de-identification works. AU-16 coordinates audit information with outside organisations, and AU-16(02) covers sharing it, which supports giving log data to customers under the contract.

Gaps

C5 limits derived data to running the service and asks the provider to name in customer contracts every purpose for collecting it, beyond those common to all cloud services. Extend the PT-03 purpose limits to all derived data, personal or anonymous, and add the purposes to the contracts. The additional criteria bring log data into regulatory compliance assessments.

OPS-12 Technical limits on who sees logs and how long they stay

Rationale

AU-09 protects audit information and logging tools from unauthorised access and tampering, and AU-09(04) gives access only to a subset of privileged users. AU-11 keeps audit records for the set period. SI-12 manages and retains information as laws and operational needs require, and SI-12(03) disposes of it once the retention period ends.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

OPS-13 Central security event analysis linked to incident response

Rationale

AU-06 reviews and analyses audit records for unusual activity, and AU-06(01), AU-06(03), AU-06(04) and AU-06(05) automate that review and bring records from many sources together for central, integrated analysis. AU-12(02) compiles the audit trail in a standard format under AU-12, which standardises log data. SI-04 monitors for attacks and analyses detected events, with SI-04(02) for real-time analysis, SI-04(05) for system alerts, SI-04(07) for automated response to suspicious events and SI-04(09) for testing the monitoring tools. IR-04(01) and IR-04(04) automate incident handling under IR-04 and correlate incident information, which links detected events to incident response.

Gaps

The additional criteria ask the provider to choose the assets on which it checks event detection according to their classification. Base the SI-04(09) tests on that classification.

OPS-14 Storing logs centrally in tamper-proof form

Rationale

AU-11 keeps audit records for a set period to support investigations. AU-09 protects audit information from unauthorised change and deletion, and AU-09(01) and AU-09(03) add write-once media and cryptographic protection, which keeps logs unchangeable. AU-06(04) brings records from many components together for central review under AU-06. IA-03 authenticates defined devices before a connection is made, and SC-08(01) encrypts log transfers under SC-08. SI-12 manages the retention of information, and SI-12(03) disposes of logs once the retention period ends.

Gaps

C5 also allows a dedicated out-of-band administration network in place of encrypting log transfers. Where the provider uses one, document the network and how it protects the logs.

OPS-15 Logs that trace each access and support forensic work

Rationale

AU-03 has each audit record show the type, time, place, source and outcome of the event and who was involved, which identifies user access. AU-08 dates each record from internal clocks in Coordinated Universal Time, and SC-45 keeps clocks in step across systems. AU-09 protects audit information from unauthorised change and deletion, and AU-10 gives irrefutable evidence of defined actions, with AU-10(03) keeping the chain of custody. IR-04(12) adds forensic analysis to the incident handling of IR-04, and AU-16(02) shares audit information with outside organisations under AU-16, which lets the provider give customers their logs.

Gaps

C5 asks the logs to identify access at the level of each tenant. Capture the state of hardware and network traffic during a security event, and show that copies of evidence match the originals. Add both to the IR-04 forensic procedures.

OPS-16 Multi-factor access to logging systems and controlled changes

Rationale

AU-09 protects audit information and logging tools from unauthorised access, and AU-09(04) limits access to a subset of privileged users. IA-02 identifies and authenticates each user uniquely, and IA-02(01) and IA-02(02) require multi-factor authentication for privileged and other accounts. CM-03 runs configuration changes through review and approval, which governs changes to the logging set-up.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

OPS-17 Alerts when logging or monitoring tools fail

Rationale

AU-05 alerts defined roles within a set time when audit logging fails and takes further defined actions. AU-05(02) sends the alerts in real time and AU-05(05) keeps an alternate logging capability. SI-06 verifies that defined security functions work and alerts staff when a check fails, which shows whether the monitoring tools are running. AU-09 protects audit information and logging tools from unauthorised access and tampering, and AU-09(02) stores records on separate physical systems.

Gaps

The additional criteria ask for the logging and monitoring platform to keep working when a single component fails. Find its single points of failure and remove them through redundancy.

Mapped Controls

OPS-18 Rules for finding and fixing vulnerabilities on time

Rationale

RA-01 and SI-01 give documented and shared policies with procedures for risk assessment and for system integrity, which hold the vulnerability rules. RA-05 scans for vulnerabilities on a set cycle and when new ones are reported, using standards to measure their impact, and remediates them within response times set by risk. It also shares what it finds with defined roles. CA-08 runs penetration tests on a set cycle, and SI-02 corrects flaws and installs security updates within a set time of their release, with SI-02(03) setting benchmarks for the time to remediate.

Gaps

C5 asks work on critical vulnerabilities to start promptly, even out of hours, and on high ones within one working day. Set those times in RA-05. C5 also asks for documented, expert-led use of any AI-based scanning tools, and for vulnerability and patch information in widely used machine-readable formats such as CSAF or VEX.

OPS-19 How incidents and crashes are handled and recorded

Rationale

IR-01 gives a documented and shared incident response policy with procedures. IR-08 has an incident response plan that defines reportable incidents and assigns responsibility for response, which covers classification and escalation. AC-03 enforces approved authorisations for logical access, which keeps crash files to authorised staff. SC-08 and SC-28 protect the confidentiality and integrity of crash files in transit and at rest, with SC-08(01) and SC-28(01) using cryptography. SI-12 manages and retains information as requirements dictate, and SI-12(03) disposes of crash files once their retention period ends.

Gaps

C5 covers operational incidents and crashes as well as security ones, including standard fixes for known issues and the criteria for treating a crash as an incident. Extend the IR-01 procedures to them and name the knowledge sources the team draws on. Add safeguards that keep sensitive data out of crash files.

OPS-20 Recording and resolving incidents as the procedures set out

Rationale

IR-04 gives an incident handling capability, in line with the incident response plan, that covers preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery. IR-05 tracks and documents each incident, which gives the record C5 asks for.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to classify and prioritise every incident, including purely operational ones. Apply IR-04 handling and IR-05 records to those incidents as well.

Mapped Controls

OPS-21 Spotting and fixing crashes of components or the service

Rationale

CP-10 recovers and rebuilds the system to a known state after a disruption or failure, which restores service after a crash. IR-04 handles crashes treated as incidents through detection, analysis, containment and recovery, and IR-05 tracks and documents them.

Gaps

C5 treats crashes as a class of their own, apart from security incidents. Set up a process that identifies and records every crash, from a single component up to the whole service, and link it to CP-10 recovery.

Mapped Controls

OPS-22 Regular, risk-based penetration testing of the service

Rationale

CA-08 runs penetration tests on defined components on a set cycle, and CA-08(01) uses an independent agent or team. CA-01 gives the documented assessment policy and procedures, which hold the testing framework. SA-11 has developers test and evaluate the system at every stage after design, and SA-11(05) and SA-11(02) add penetration testing before launch and threat modelling. RA-05 measures vulnerability impact against standards and remediates within set response times, and RA-05(08) reviews historic audit logs to see whether a flaw was exploited before it was found. SI-02 corrects flaws, and SI-02(07) analyses their root cause.

Gaps

C5 asks the testing framework to set the qualifications testers need. Plan the tests so that every relevant component is tested at least once in three years. The additional criteria also ask for a yearly review of how effective the tests are.

OPS-23 Measuring how well vulnerability and incident handling works

Rationale

PM-06 has the provider track and report measures of security performance, which can show how well the vulnerability and incident procedures work. IR-08 has the incident response plan provide metrics for the response capability. IR-03 tests how effective the response capability is on a set cycle, and IR-03(03) uses the test results to improve the process.

Gaps

C5 asks responsible staff to evaluate the results in writing at least once a quarter, to start improvements and check that they work. Set metrics for the vulnerability procedures alongside the IR-08 incident metrics.

Mapped Controls

OPS-24 Keeping affected customers informed during incidents

Rationale

IR-07 provides an incident response support resource that gives users of the system advice and help with handling and reporting incidents, which lets customers take part in resolving them. The resource is part of the provider's own incident response capability.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to update affected customers on an incident's status at regular intervals and to tell them what was done once it is resolved. Write both into the customer contracts. The additional criterion adds a contract term for customers to confirm, within a set time, that the fix dealt with the root cause.

Mapped Controls

OPS-25 Scanning for known vulnerabilities at least monthly

Rationale

RA-05 scans for vulnerabilities on a set cycle and when new ones are reported, and scores their impact against standards. It remediates them within set response times, and RA-05(02) keeps the list of vulnerabilities to scan for up to date. SI-02 corrects flaws and installs security updates within a set time, and SI-02(03) measures how long remediation takes. SI-04 monitors for attacks against defined objectives and adjusts monitoring when risk changes, which lets scan results sharpen the detection of known flaws being exploited.

Gaps

C5 asks for scans at least once a month, or daily under the additional criteria. Set that frequency in RA-05, and feed each scan's results into the rules of the security event management system so they detect active exploitation of known vulnerabilities.

Mapped Controls

OPS-26 Hardening production components to industry benchmarks

Rationale

CM-06 sets configuration settings in the most restrictive mode that operations allow, based on common secure configurations, and monitors changes to them. CM-06(01) verifies the settings automatically and CM-06(02) responds to unauthorised changes. CM-07 limits each system to essential capabilities and restricts unneeded functions, ports, protocols and services. CM-02 keeps a documented baseline configuration under configuration control, and CM-02(03) retains earlier versions, which records image configurations. SI-07 uses integrity verification tools to detect unauthorised changes to defined software and information, which shows whether components stay hardened.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to check each immutable image against the hardening specification when the image is created. Add that check to the image build process.

OPS-27 Rules for timely, tested patching

Rationale

SI-01 and CM-01 give documented and shared policies with procedures for system integrity and configuration management, which hold the patch rules and tie them to change management. SI-02 tests updates for effectiveness and side effects before installation and installs security updates within a set time. It also builds flaw remediation into configuration management, with SI-02(04) adding automated patch management tools. CM-03 runs changes through review and approval, CM-03(02) tests and validates them first, and CM-04(01) analyses them in a separate test environment under CM-04. CM-02(03) retains earlier configurations under CM-02, which supports rolling back, and RA-05 scans for vulnerabilities, which shows whether a patch removed them.

Gaps

C5 asks for patches to be scheduled in maintenance windows where that limits disruption. Add that to the SI-01 procedures. The additional criterion also asks for an exception process for patches that need manual work.

OPS-28 Deploying patches through change control

Rationale

SI-02 installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within a set time of their release, after testing them. SI-02(04) and SI-02(05) support deployment with automated patch management tools and automatic updates. CM-03 implements approved changes and keeps records of them, which runs patch deployment through change control.

Gaps

C5 asks the deployment to follow every measure in the patch policy, such as scheduling patches in maintenance windows. Check that the SI-02 and CM-03 processes apply them.

Mapped Controls

OPS-29 Keeping third-party and open-source libraries up to date

Rationale

RA-05 monitors and scans the system and hosted applications for vulnerabilities on a set cycle and when new ones are reported, which finds known flaws in libraries. CM-04 analyses each change for its security impact before it is made, which judges the effect of library updates. SI-02 tests updates and installs security updates within a set time, which covers updating third-party and open-source libraries.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to track the updates available for third-party and open-source libraries, as well as their known vulnerabilities. Add that tracking to the RA-05 monitoring.

Mapped Controls

OPS-30 Rules for keeping each customer's data apart

Rationale

SC-01 gives a documented and shared system and communications protection policy with procedures, which holds the separation rules. PL-08 has the provider develop security architectures that describe the requirements and approach for protecting its information, which can set out the separation measures for each protection goal. SC-04 prevents unauthorised and unintended transfer of information through shared system resources, which is the aim of separating customers' data.

Gaps

C5 asks for a documented cloud layer model with the separation measures for each layer, sorted by protection goal and by whether they prevent, detect or react. Base the measures on a risk assessment, and monitor them so that deviations trigger action. Record this in the PL-08 architecture.

Mapped Controls

OPS-31 Strict separation of customer data on shared resources

Rationale

SC-04 prevents unauthorised and unintended transfer of information through shared system resources. SC-32 partitions the system into components in separate physical or logical domains, and SC-50 enforces separation in software between defined security domains, such as tenants. SC-39 keeps a separate execution domain for each process, and SC-28(01) protects stored information with cryptography under SC-28, which supports cryptographic separation of customer data. RA-03 reviews the risk assessment on a set cycle and updates it after significant changes, such as changes to the architecture.

Gaps

C5 asks for measures that detect and respond to breaches of separation as well as prevent them. Add those measures, tied to the documented separation approach.

OPS-32 Policy for protecting data in use with trusted hardware

Rationale

SC-01 gives a documented and shared system and communications protection policy with procedures, which can hold the confidential computing rules. SC-49 enforces separation between defined security domains in hardware, which is how trusted execution environments shield data in use. SC-12 manages cryptographic keys under defined rules for their generation, distribution, storage, access and destruction, and SC-13 implements the types of cryptography each use requires. SA-05 gives customers documentation of the security functions open to them and how to use them, which tells them about the confidential computing features.

Gaps

C5 asks the policy to state which parts of the stack each confidential computing technology protects and which suppliers are involved. C5 also asks that customer data and its keys stay beyond the reach of the provider and of any other unauthorised party. Add both to the SC-01 policy, and offer remote attestation of the protected environments.

OPS-33 Letting customers verify trusted execution remotely

Rationale

SI-07 uses integrity verification tools to detect unauthorised changes to defined software and firmware. SI-07(06) adds cryptographic protection and SI-07(09) verifies the boot process, which roots the checks in cryptography and trusted components. SA-05 gives customers documentation of the security functions open to them and how to use them, which documents the attestation features and levels.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to offer customers remote attestation of the protection of data in use, rooted in trusted hardware and software. Provide an interface through which customers can check the integrity of the attestation.

Mapped Controls

OPS-34 Securing containers and images across their life cycle

Rationale

CM-01 gives a documented configuration management policy with procedures for the container life cycle, and CM-02 keeps baseline configurations under control, which governs how images are built and validated. CM-03 runs changes to containers and images through review and approval, CM-06 and CM-07 harden them with restrictive settings and only essential services, and CM-08 inventories them. CM-14 allows installation only of components whose signature is verified against an approved certificate, which enforces signed images, and RA-05 scans hosted applications, images included, for vulnerabilities. AU-02 sets the events to log along the life cycle, SI-04 monitors for attacks and analyses anomalies, and SI-03 adds malware protection where containers need it. AC-03 enforces approved access to container hosts, SC-04 keeps customer data apart on shared resources, and SC-08 and SC-28 protect data in transit and at rest.

Gaps

C5 asks the policy to cover how images are stored and retrieved, and to keep the image signing key in secure storage. Add both to the CM-01 procedures for containers.

OPS-35 Putting the container rules into practice

Rationale

CM-02 keeps the baseline configuration of images current and under control, and CM-03 implements only approved changes to containers and images. CM-06 applies restrictive configuration settings and CM-07 limits containers to essential services, with CM-07(06) confining them to environments with limited privileges. CM-14 allows installation only of components whose signature is verified against an approved certificate, CM-08 keeps running containers in the inventory, and RA-05 scans images for vulnerabilities. AC-03 enforces approved access to container hosts, SC-04 keeps customer data apart on shared resources, and SC-08 and SC-28 protect data in transit and at rest. SI-03 protects containers from malware where needed, and SI-04 monitors their networks and behaviour for attacks and anomalies.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to put the whole container policy into practice, including how it stores and retrieves images and how it keeps the image signing key safe. Build both into the container processes.

IAM-01 Identity and access policy with a role-based framework

Rationale

AC-01 and IA-01 have the provider document and share policies and procedures for access control and for identification and authentication. AC-02 sets account types, approvals, the privileges of each account and regular reviews, which supports a list of each identity's rights, and AC-02(02), AC-02(03) and AC-02(07) cover emergency, inactive and privileged accounts. AC-03(07) enforces access through roles and AC-06 grants only the access each task needs, while AC-05 documents the duties to keep apart. IA-02 identifies each user uniquely and IA-04 assigns identifiers only with approval, and IA-02(01) adds multi-factor authentication for privileged accounts. AC-17 sets the rules and approval for each type of remote access, and AU-06 reviews audit records for unusual activity at a frequency the provider sets.

Gaps

C5 asks the policy to cover access across geographic boundaries and the steps to take when an identity may be compromised, such as disabling it. Add both to the AC-01 policy. Set the AU-06 review of access logs to at least monthly.

IAM-02 Granting and changing identities, with break-glass rules

Rationale

AC-02 requires approval of account requests and creates, modifies, disables and removes accounts by criteria the provider sets. It also reviews accounts at a set frequency, which checks the permissions in place, and AC-02(02) manages temporary and emergency accounts, such as break-glass accounts. AC-03 enforces approved authorisations for logical access, so only authorised staff reach the provider's data and system functions. IA-04 requires approval from set roles before an identifier goes to a person, group, role, service or device, which covers system components as well as people.

Gaps

C5 asks for specific rules on the safe use of break-glass accounts, beyond the automatic handling in AC-02(02). Write those rules into the account management procedures.

Mapped Controls

IAM-03 Risk-based locking of identities and watch for stolen credentials

Rationale

AC-02(03) disables accounts after a set period of inactivity, AC-02(12) watches accounts for atypical use and AC-02(13) disables the accounts of high-risk individuals. AC-07 locks an account or node after a set number of failed logon attempts, which answers brute force attacks. IA-05 sets procedures for lost or compromised authenticators and for revoking them, and AU-13 watches open sources for signs that organisational information, such as credentials, has leaked. CP-13 brings in alternative security mechanisms when the primary means is unavailable or compromised, which serves as the exception path when every managing identity may be compromised. CA-02 assesses whether these controls work as intended, and CA-05 plans the remediation of the weaknesses found.

Gaps

C5 bases the procedure on the types of data each identity can reach. Set the locking and withdrawal parameters by that data, and exempt the identities kept for emergency recovery from automatic locking.

IAM-04 Adjusting or removing access when duties or tasks change

Rationale

AC-02 notifies account managers within set periods when users are transferred or their need to know changes, and modifies or removes accounts to match. AC-02(02) manages temporary accounts automatically, which suits time-limited access during a role change. PS-05 reviews the need for access when staff move to another role and modifies their authorisations to match. PS-04 disables system access within a set period when employment ends and revokes the person's credentials. PS-07 requires external providers to report transfers and terminations of their staff who hold credentials or privileges.

Gaps

C5 sets deadlines of 48 hours for privileged rights and 14 days for all other rights. Use them as the periods in AC-02, PS-04 and PS-05, and repeat the granting procedure after each revocation. Record an approval and an end date for any temporary access given during a role change.

IAM-05 Yearly access review and clean-up of orphaned resources

Rationale

AC-02 reviews accounts against the account management rules at a set frequency and modifies or removes accounts to match. AC-06(07) reviews user privileges at a set frequency to confirm they are still needed. CM-08 keeps an accurate inventory of system components, and CM-08(04) records who is accountable for each one, which reveals any orphaned resources.

Gaps

C5 asks for each deviation the review finds to be fixed within seven days. Set that deadline in the review procedure. When an identity is revoked, reassign or securely delete every production resource it owned.

Mapped Controls

IAM-06 Managing and monitoring privileged access

Rationale

AC-02(07) runs privileged accounts under a role-based scheme and watches privileged role assignments. AC-06 limits access to what tasks need, AC-06(05) keeps privileged accounts to set personnel and AC-06(09) logs the use of privileged functions. AU-12 generates the audit records, AU-06(01) brings automated processes into their review, and SI-04(20) adds monitoring of privileged users, with SI-04(05) raising alerts. IA-02(01) requires multi-factor authentication for privileged accounts, and IA-02(05) requires individual sign-in before a shared account is used. PS-08 applies a formal sanctions process to people who break security policies.

Gaps

C5 asks for phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication with domain binding, such as FIDO2 keys, for privileged users. It also asks for a list of the people responsible for each non-human identity, reviewed every six months, and for a privileged access management tool with just-in-time elevation. Build these into the IA-02 and AC-02 arrangements.

IAM-07 Tenant separation and notice of provider access to customer data

Rationale

SC-32 places system components in separate physical or logical domains, SC-07(21) isolates set components, and SC-04 prevents unintended transfer of information through shared resources, which keeps customers apart. SC-03 isolates security functions from other functions, which keeps the components that manage access apart from those that store data. SC-02 separates user functions from system management, which serves separate interfaces for customer administrators and end users. PS-03 screens staff before they get access, and MA-05 has authorised, competent staff supervise the maintenance work of those who lack the required authorisations. For supervised access, AC-03(02) requires a second person to approve set actions, AU-14 lets set roles view or record a user session and AU-12 generates the audit records. IA-02 and IA-03 authenticate the supervised person and their device, and AC-04 enforces approved information flows, which can block data heading to that device.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to tell customers within 72 hours when its staff read or write their data, with the cause, time, place and scope of the access. It also asks for prior customer consent and for contracts that list every case where the provider can see unencrypted data. Add these terms to the customer contract and the access procedure.

IAM-08 Authentication of staff and components, with MFA and lockout

Rationale

IA-02 uniquely identifies and authenticates staff, IA-02(01) and IA-02(02) require multi-factor authentication for privileged and other accounts, and IA-02(05) requires individual sign-in before a shared account is used. IA-03 authenticates devices before they connect, and IA-09 authenticates system services and applications before they communicate, which covers components in automated processes. IA-01 documents and shares the authentication policy, and IA-05 sets the strength, first issue, regular change and protection of authenticators, with procedures for lost or compromised ones. RA-03 assesses threats and vulnerabilities, which grounds the authentication requirements and the judgement of when a mechanism is out of date, and SA-22 replaces components once their supplier stops supporting them. AC-07 locks an account after a set number of failed logon attempts.

Gaps

C5 asks for multi-factor authentication for automated processes as well as for people, so extend the rule to service identities. Add the ageing of authentication mechanisms to the RA-03 risk assessment and plan their replacement from its results.

IAM-09 Safe handling of passwords and other credentials

Rationale

IA-05 verifies who receives an authenticator when it is first issued and protects authenticator content from disclosure and change. IA-05(01) sets rules for password-based authentication, IA-05(06) protects authenticators to the level of the information they unlock and IA-05(18) covers password managers. AC-09(03) notifies users of changes to their account, such as a password reset, and SC-13 applies the types of cryptography set for each use, such as hashing stored passwords. PL-04 gives users rules on their security duties and collects a documented acknowledgement, and AT-02 trains them, with AT-02(03) on social engineering such as phishing.

Gaps

C5 limits an initial password to 14 days and a reset procedure to 24 hours. Set both limits in IA-05. Assess any departure from the password rules for risk and apply the measures that follow from it.

CRY-01 Cryptography policy and post-quantum strategy

Rationale

SC-01 has the provider document and share a system and communications protection policy with procedures, which holds the cryptography rules, and review it at set intervals. SC-13 sets the types of cryptography for each use, which covers encryption, hashing, signatures and protocols. SC-12 sets the key management requirements for generation, distribution, storage, access and destruction, and CM-03(06) brings cryptographic mechanisms under change control. RA-03 assesses threats and vulnerabilities, which is where deviations and quantum risks are weighed, and PM-15 keeps contact with security groups to stay current with recommended practices and technologies.

Gaps

C5 asks for crypto-agility and for a check of the policy against BSI TR-02102 or NIST guidance such as FIPS 140. Cover crypto-agility in the SC-01 policy and add the check to its review. For the optional post-quantum strategy, keep a ranked inventory of the mechanisms in use and a transition plan with hybrid schemes and trigger events.

CRY-02 Assessing and recording changes to cryptographic systems

Rationale

CM-04 analyses each change for its possible security and privacy impact before it is made. CM-03 reviews proposed changes with that analysis in view, documents the decisions and keeps records of the changes, and CM-03(06) brings cryptographic mechanisms under this control, so cryptographic changes stay traceable. AT-03 gives role-based training to set roles at a set frequency and when system changes call for it, which reaches the staff who run cryptographic systems.

Gaps

C5 asks the impact analysis to weigh disruption to customer workloads along with cost and benefit. Tell customers how a cryptographic change may affect their own setups before it takes effect.

Mapped Controls

CRY-03 Yearly and incident-driven audits of cryptographic practice

Rationale

CA-02 assesses controls at a set frequency to find out whether they are implemented correctly and work as intended, which covers audits of encryption, authentication and key management. CA-05 keeps a plan of action that records the remediation planned for weaknesses found, which drives the updates the review calls for.

Gaps

C5 asks for a review at least once a year and straight after any security incident that involves cryptographic components. Set both triggers for CA-02, and have each review compare the practices with the current state of the art.

Mapped Controls

CRY-04 Encrypting and authenticating data in transit

Rationale

SC-08 protects the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit, and SC-08(01) does so with cryptography, which covers customer data sent over public networks. SC-13 sets the types of cryptography for each use, and SC-23 protects the authenticity of communication sessions. AC-17 sets connection requirements for each type of remote access, and AC-17(02) encrypts remote sessions to protect them. IA-02 authenticates the staff who connect to production.

Gaps

C5 asks for encryption that matches the state of the art. Choose current algorithms and protocol settings in SC-13 and keep them under review.

CRY-05 Encrypting stored customer data and keeping keys with the customer

Rationale

SC-28 protects set information at rest, and SC-28(01) does so with cryptography, which covers customer data in storage. SC-13 sets the types of cryptography for that use, and SC-12 sets the rules for key storage and access, which can limit who reaches the keys. SC-04 prevents unintended transfer of information through shared resources, which supports the optional rule that customer data stays unrecoverable when resources are reallocated. CA-02 assesses at a set frequency whether controls work as intended, which covers testing the controls around a master key.

Gaps

C5 asks for the keys to be held by the customer alone, with any provider access handled as a set exception. Agree the key procedures and their exceptions with each customer, and tell customers of any change that could weaken the protection of their data.

CRY-06 Creating keys from secure random bit generators

Rationale

SC-12 manages keys under set requirements that include key generation, and SC-12(02) and SC-12(03) cover symmetric and asymmetric keys. SC-13 sets the types of cryptography for each use, which is where the provider can require approved random bit generators.

Gaps

C5 asks for keys to come from secure random bit generators, or from keys made that way. Write this rule into the SC-12 key generation requirements.

Mapped Controls

CRY-07 Scheduled key rotation and notice when the provider skips it

Rationale

SC-12 manages keys under requirements the provider sets for their generation, distribution, storage, access and destruction. Those requirements are the place for a rotation schedule that follows the cryptography policy.

Gaps

SC-12 leaves rotation to the provider's own key requirements. Add a rotation schedule to them, in line with the cryptography policy. When a risk assessment leads the provider to skip rotation, tell the affected customers.

Mapped Controls

CRY-08 Issuing and obtaining certificates securely

Rationale

SC-17 issues public key certificates under a set certificate policy or obtains them from an approved provider, and keeps only approved trust anchors in the trust stores. IA-05 verifies the identity of the person, service or device that receives an authenticator when it is first issued, and IA-05(02) covers public key-based authentication. SC-12(03) covers the management of asymmetric keys, which protects the keys behind the certificates.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

CRY-09 Issuing keys to verified holders with set validity dates

Rationale

SC-12 sets the requirements for key distribution and access, which govern how keys are provisioned and activated. IA-05 verifies the identity of whoever receives an authenticator when it is first issued, which applies to keys that act as authenticators.

Gaps

C5 asks for an authorisation check before each key is activated, and for every key to carry activation and deactivation dates. Add both to the SC-12 key requirements.

Mapped Controls

CRY-10 Protected key stores separate from the application layer

Rationale

SC-03 isolates security functions from other functions, which keeps the key management system apart from the application and middleware layers. SC-12 sets the requirements for key storage and access, which define how authorised users reach the keys. SC-28(03) provides protected storage for cryptographic keys, which matches the optional hardware or software security module.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to decide where keys may reside, to meet legal and contract terms. Record the permitted locations in the SC-12 requirements and enforce them.

Mapped Controls

CRY-11 Archiving keys safely for later recovery

Rationale

SC-12 sets requirements for key storage, access and destruction, and SC-12(01) keeps information available when keys are lost, which supports recovery through archived keys. AC-06 allows only the access each task needs, which limits archived keys to authorised staff. AU-02 names the events to log, such as storing and recovering an archived key, and AU-12 generates the audit records for them.

Gaps

C5 limits how long archived keys are kept. Set a retention period in the SC-12 requirements and destroy keys securely when it ends.

CRY-12 Overseeing changes in key state, such as suspension

Rationale

SC-12 manages keys under requirements the provider sets for each stage of a key's life, from generation to destruction. Those requirements are where rules for suspending and reactivating keys can sit.

Gaps

C5 asks for oversight and approval of each change in a key's state, including moves into and out of suspension. Define these states and the approval step in the SC-12 key requirements.

Mapped Controls

CRY-13 Limiting compromised keys and telling affected customers

Rationale

IA-05 sets procedures for lost or compromised authenticators and for revoking them, which covers keys used to authenticate. SC-12 manages keys under set requirements for access and destruction, which can confine a compromised key to decryption or signature checks.

Gaps

C5 asks for compromised keys to serve only for decryption or signature checks, under controlled conditions. Write this into the SC-12 requirements. Tell affected customers promptly when their keys are compromised and withdrawn from encryption and signing.

Mapped Controls

CRY-14 Retiring keys and logging their destruction

Rationale

SC-12 sets requirements for key destruction, which is where the rules for expired and deactivated keys belong. AU-02 names the event types to log, such as deactivating or destroying a key, and AU-12 generates the audit records for them, which leaves an audit trail.

Gaps

C5 limits expired keys to decryption and signature checks, and asks for key metadata to be kept for audit after a key is destroyed. Add both rules to the SC-12 requirements.

Mapped Controls

CRY-15 Safe use of pre-shared keys and wildcard certificates

Rationale

SC-12(02) covers the management of symmetric keys, which include pre-shared keys. SC-17 issues public key certificates under a set certificate policy, which can set rules for wildcard certificates.

Gaps

C5 asks for dedicated procedures for pre-shared keys and wildcard certificates. Add them to the key management requirements and the certificate policy, and state where each may be used.

Mapped Controls

CRY-16 Key backup or redundancy to keep key services running

Rationale

CP-09 backs up system-level information and protects the backup copies, which covers secure backups of key material. SC-12(01) keeps information available when keys are lost, which supports procedures to recover lost or corrupted keys.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to weigh backups of HSM key material against redundant HSMs, including how exposed the keys would be if the provider lost control of them. Document the choice and review the chosen measure for effectiveness and against contract and legal terms.

Mapped Controls

CRY-17 Tracking keys through their lives, with full records

Rationale

SC-12 manages keys under set requirements from generation through distribution, storage and access to destruction, which spans the life of a key. AU-02 names the events to log, such as each change in a key's status, and AU-12 generates the audit records that build each key's history.

Gaps

C5 asks for a full record of each key, apart from ephemeral keys, from creation to destruction, with every change of status. Keep this record in the key management system as well as in the event log.

Mapped Controls

CRY-18 Using an outside key management service securely

Rationale

SA-04 puts security assurance requirements into the acquisition contract, and SA-04(07) calls for products evaluated against approved protection profiles, which supports recognised certifications. SA-09 requires whoever runs the external service to meet the provider's security requirements, and the provider monitors that compliance. AC-03 enforces approved authorisations, so only authorised users and systems reach the keys, and SC-12 sets the key management requirements, which is where rotation and renewal belong. AU-02 names each access to and operation on the external system as an event to log, AU-12 generates the records and AU-06 reviews them for unusual activity. RA-05 scans for vulnerabilities at a set frequency, and SI-02 installs security updates within a set time.

Gaps

C5 asks for a secure integration of the external key management system into the cloud infrastructure. Design and test that integration to protect the keys it handles.

CRY-19 Protecting keys that customers bring and manage

Rationale

SC-12 sets requirements for key distribution, storage and access, which can cover bringing customer-generated keys into the environment. AC-03 enforces approved authorisations, so only authorised users reach customer-managed keys. AU-02 names all activity on those keys as events to log, and AU-12 generates the audit records.

Gaps

C5 asks for specific steps to import keys that customers generate themselves. Add a bring-your-own-key procedure to the SC-12 requirements.

COS-01 Layered defences that detect and stop network attacks

Rationale

SI-04 monitors the system for attacks, signs of attack and unauthorised connections, and SI-04(04) and SI-04(11) watch inbound and outbound traffic for unusual patterns. PL-08(01) builds the security architecture in layers, SC-07 monitors and controls traffic at managed interfaces, and SC-05 protects against or limits denial-of-service events such as DDoS. SI-10 checks the validity of inputs, and SI-10(06) prevents injection of untrusted data. IA-03 authenticates devices before they connect, which keeps unknown devices off the network, and AU-06(03) and AU-06(04) correlate audit records and analyse them centrally, as a SIEM does. SC-01 and SI-01 document the policies and procedures that hold these safeguards.

Gaps

C5 names attacks on IoT devices and DNS tunnelling among the threats to cover. Add them to the SI-04 monitoring objectives, and choose the safeguards from the results of a risk assessment.

COS-02 Network zoning and permitted connections inside the provider

Rationale

SC-07 places public components in separate subnetworks and connects to external networks only through managed interfaces arranged under the security architecture, and SC-07(29) isolates functions in separate subnets, which supports separate management traffic. AC-04 enforces approved information flows within the system and between connected systems, which sets the permitted communication relationships. CM-07 restricts functions, ports, protocols and services to those allowed. CA-09 authorises internal connections and documents the security requirements of each, which covers communication across partitions. AC-17 and AC-18 set connection requirements for remote and wireless access, which covers VPN and Wi-Fi in office networks.

Gaps

C5 asks the requirements to say when customers are kept apart logically and when physically. Record those cases in the security architecture behind SC-07.

COS-03 Trusted and untrusted zones, with yearly network reviews

Rationale

SC-07 places public components in separate subnetworks and monitors and controls traffic at managed interfaces, which gives trusted and untrusted zones and a DMZ. SI-04 watches for unauthorised local, network and remote connections. CM-06 sets, applies and monitors configuration settings, which keeps the network configuration in line with the requirements, and CA-09 reviews the continued need for each internal connection at a set frequency. CM-07(01) reviews functions, ports, protocols and services at a set frequency to find those that are unnecessary or insecure. RA-07 responds to findings in line with risk tolerance, and CA-05 tracks the planned remediation.

Gaps

C5 asks for a recorded justification of the compensating measures wherever an insecure protocol stays in use. Include it in the CM-07(01) review.

COS-04 Security gateways at each network boundary

Rationale

SC-07 connects to external networks only through managed interfaces made of boundary protection devices, which places a security gateway at each network perimeter. AC-04 enforces approved authorisations for information flows between connected systems, which governs access from one network to another.

Gaps

C5 asks for each approval of access across networks to rest on a security assessment of the customers' requirements. Add that assessment to the AC-04 flow policies, and make the gateways redundant and highly available if you adopt the sharper optional criterion.

Mapped Controls

COS-05 Separate administration networks protected by MFA

Rationale

SC-07(29) uses separate subnets to isolate functions, and SC-07(15) routes networked privileged access through a dedicated managed interface, which gives separate networks for administration and for workload orchestration. SC-02 separates system management functions, such as management consoles, from user functions. IA-02(01) requires multi-factor authentication for privileged accounts, which protects access to the administration networks. SC-08(01) protects transmitted information with cryptography, which covers administration traffic that shares a physical network.

Gaps

COS-06 Keeping each customer's traffic apart on shared networks

Rationale

AC-04(21) separates information flows by physical or logical means, which keeps each customer's traffic apart at network level. SC-07 places public components in separate subnetworks, and SC-07(21) isolates set system components. SC-08 protects the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit, and SC-08(01) adds cryptography, which is the encryption option C5 offers for IaaS and PaaS.

Gaps

C5 asks for a documented framework that sets out how customer traffic is kept apart on shared networks. Write it and link it to the AC-04 flow policies.

Mapped Controls

COS-07 Current network maps and where customer data is kept

Rationale

PL-02 builds a security plan that defines the system's components and describes its environment and its connections to other systems, and reviews the plan at a set frequency. CA-09 documents each internal connection, including the nature of the information exchanged, which records the data flows between subnets and components. CM-12 documents where set information is processed and stored and on which components, which shows where customer data sits. CM-08 keeps an accurate inventory of system components, which ties the network picture to the asset inventory.

Gaps

C5 asks for network documentation that shows how subnets are allocated and zoned and how the network links to outside networks. Review it at least once a year and correct promptly any deviation the review finds.

COS-08 Policy and safeguards for moving data securely

Rationale

SC-01 has the provider document and share a system and communications protection policy with procedures, which holds the rules for data transmission. SC-08 protects the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit, which guards against interception and tampering, and SC-13 sets the cryptography for each use. SI-03 places malicious code protection at system entry and exit points. CA-02 assesses the controls at a set frequency, which covers the regular review of the transmission safeguards.

Gaps

C5 asks the transmission policy to refer to the asset classification and labelling scheme. Add that link in the SC-01 policy, and review the safeguards after each significant change to the service as well as on the CA-02 cycle.

PI-01 Secure, documented interfaces for customer systems and data export

Rationale

SC-08 protects the confidentiality and integrity of data in transit, and SC-08(01) uses cryptography for interface traffic over untrusted networks. IA-08 identifies and authenticates users and processes from outside the organisation, and IA-08(02) accepts external authenticators, which supports customer identity providers. SI-07 uses integrity verification tools to detect unauthorised changes to set information, and CP-09 backs up user-level and system-level information and protects the backups. SA-05 provides user documentation on functions and ways of interacting with the system, which keeps customers informed about protocols and formats. SC-07 monitors and controls traffic at external managed interfaces, which supports an application firewall in front of customer administration interfaces.

Gaps

C5 asks for standard data formats and processing standards that let other systems work with the data. It also asks the provider to give customers the technical means to extract their data, or an extraction service where self-service is impractical. Build both into the service and describe them in the customer documentation.

PI-02 Contract terms for returning customer data at exit
0%

Rationale

Gaps

SP 800-53 covers contracts only from the buyer's side, as when an organisation acquires a service. C5 asks for terms the provider gives its own customers on handing back their data when the contract ends, covering format, delivery, time frames, the deletion date and ownership of the data. Write these terms into the customer contract.

PI-03 Deleting customer data at contract end, with proof

Rationale

MP-06 sanitises media before disposal, release or reuse with mechanisms whose strength matches the classification of the information, which resists forensic recovery. MP-06(01) reviews, tracks, documents and verifies the sanitisation, which gives a record of it. SI-12 manages and retains information in line with laws and other requirements, and SI-12(03) disposes of information when its retention period ends.

Gaps

C5 asks for deletion that follows the customer contract and for proof of deletion the customer can obtain. Tie the MP-06 procedures to the contract terms and give each customer a record that its data was deleted.

Mapped Controls

DEV-01 Secure development rules across the whole service life cycle

Rationale

SA-01 has the provider document and share a system and services acquisition policy with procedures, which holds the rules for secure development and procurement. SA-03 runs a development life cycle that builds in security and integrates risk management. SA-08 applies security engineering principles from specification to modification, which is security by design, and SA-08(33) on minimisation supports keeping provider access to customer data low. SA-15 requires a documented development process that addresses security and names its standards and tools, and SA-11 has the developer test, produce evidence and fix the flaws found. SA-04(07) calls for products evaluated against approved protection profiles, which matches the optional preference for certified products.

Gaps

C5 asks for a risk assessment whenever an uncertified product is bought in place of an available certified one. Add this step to the SA-04 acquisition procedure, and cover secure deployment through continuous delivery in the development rules.

DEV-02 Contract terms and risk checks for outsourced development

Rationale

SA-04 puts security requirements, assurance requirements and acceptance criteria into the contract with the developer. SA-15 requires the developer to follow a documented process that addresses security and names its standards and tools. SA-11 has the developer test the work, produce evidence of the results and fix the flaws found, which gives proof of checks for known vulnerabilities. SR-06 assesses the supply chain risks of contractors and of what they provide, which covers the risk assessment before outsourcing. SA-09 requires external providers to meet the provider's security requirements and monitors their compliance, which supports oversight of the outsourced work.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider's own staff to run the tests that decide whether a change containing outsourced work may be deployed. Assign those tests to internal staff in the release procedure.

DEV-03 Change management policy for the service's components

Rationale

CM-01 has the provider document and share a configuration management policy with procedures, which holds the change rules, and CM-09 sets out roles, responsibilities and processes in a configuration management plan. CM-03 sets which changes are controlled, approves them with a security impact analysis and keeps records, and CM-03(02) tests, validates and documents changes. CM-04 analyses each change for its security and privacy impact before it is made, which supports sorting changes by risk. AC-05 documents the duties to keep apart, such as development, testing and release, and SA-10 has the developer make only approved changes and document their security impact.

Gaps

C5 asks the policy to cover how customers learn of changes and of their duty to cooperate. Add rules for emergency changes at the normal security level and for correcting unexpected effects of a change.

DEV-04 Role-based training on secure delivery and malicious code

Rationale

AT-03 gives role-based security training to set roles before they take up duties and at a set frequency, and keeps its content up to date, which covers secure development and delivery and the tools used. AT-02 gives security literacy training and awareness to all users, contractors included, and updates its content, which covers the risks of malicious code.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

DEV-05 Documented design of security functions, based on analysis

Rationale

SA-17 requires the developer to produce a design specification and security architecture that describe the required security functions accurately and completely. SA-11(02) has the developer carry out threat modelling and vulnerability analyses, which is the security analysis behind the design.

Gaps

C5 asks the design documents to state what each security feature takes in and returns, and which errors it can raise. It also asks for an analysis of how well each feature is likely to work. Add both to the SA-17 design specification.

Mapped Controls

DEV-06 Assessing the risk of each change before release

Rationale

CM-04 analyses each change for its possible security and privacy impact before it is made, which is the risk assessment of the change. CM-03 reviews proposed changes and approves or rejects them with that analysis in view, which lets the provider require mitigation of a high-risk change before it reaches production.

Gaps

C5 asks for the combined effects of changes made at the same time to be assessed, and for the risks found to be ranked. Add both to the CM-04 analysis. Send customers details of the highest-risk changes in advance, so they can assess the risk themselves.

Mapped Controls

DEV-07 Risk-based, documented tests before changes go live

Rationale

CM-03(02) tests, validates and documents changes before they are finalised. SA-11 has the developer test at a set depth and coverage, produce evidence of the results and fix the flaws found, and SA-11(07) verifies the scope of that testing. SA-03(02) approves, documents and controls the use of live data in preproduction environments, and SI-19 removes set personal data elements from datasets, which anonymises customer data used in tests. CA-08 runs penetration tests on set systems, which covers the optional tests before launch.

Gaps

C5 asks for the customer's approval before its data is used in tests, and for customers to take part in tests where the contract says so. Record for each test of a security feature its description, starting conditions, expected outcome and the steps to run it.

DEV-08 Tracing every production change to who made it

Rationale

CM-05 defines, approves and enforces access restrictions for changes, and CM-05(01) enforces them automatically and keeps audit records, which applies a rights framework to version control and deployment tools. AU-12 generates audit records for the defined events, and AU-03 requires each record to show the identity of the people or components involved, which traces each change to its source. CM-03 keeps records of controlled changes and monitors change activity, which supports the optional monitoring of production changes.

Gaps

DEV-09 Tracking every software and configuration change, with rollback

Rationale

SA-10 has the developer document, manage and control the integrity of changes to configuration items, and SA-10(05) keeps the integrity of the mapping used for version control. CM-09 defines the configuration items and places them under configuration management, which brings software and configurations into scope. CM-02 keeps a current baseline configuration, and CM-02(03) retains earlier configurations to support rollback.

Gaps

C5 asks for safeguards that keep customer data intact and available when a component is rolled back to an earlier state. Add them to the rollback procedure.

Mapped Controls

DEV-10 Approving changes before they reach production

Rationale

CM-03 reviews proposed changes and approves or rejects them, documents the decisions and monitors change activity, which covers approval before release and the optional monitoring of the approval process. SA-10 requires the developer to implement only changes the organisation has approved.

Gaps

C5 asks for customers to take part in releases as their contracts set out. Add that step to the CM-03 release procedure.

Mapped Controls

DEV-11 Risk-based protection of non-production environments

Rationale

RA-03 assesses threats and vulnerabilities and the likely harm, which covers the risk assessment of development and test environments. SA-03(01) protects preproduction environments in line with risk across the life cycle. CP-09 backs up user-level and system-level information at a set frequency, which extends the backups to the parts of these environments that need them.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

DEV-12 Keeping production apart from test and development

Rationale

SC-32 places system components in separate physical or logical domains, which keeps production apart from test and development. CM-04(01) analyses changes in a separate test environment before they reach operations. SA-03(02) approves, documents and controls any use of live data in preproduction environments, which governs customer data in test or development.

Gaps

C5 asks for the customer's explicit approval before production data is used in test or development. It also asks the provider to keep production keys and secrets out of other environments, and to document and justify any reuse it has to make.

Mapped Controls

DEV-13 Keeping a software bill of materials up to date

Rationale

CM-08 keeps an inventory of system components at the level of detail needed for tracking and reporting, and updates it at a set frequency, which can hold the list of software components. SR-04 documents, monitors and maintains the provenance of set components and their data, which records where each software component came from.

Gaps

C5 asks for a component list for every software component the provider develops or integrates. Treat an integrated component as an exception only when its list cannot reasonably be produced, and handle its risk through the exception process.

Mapped Controls

DEV-14 Rules for outside and open-source software and hardware

Rationale

CM-01 and SR-01 have the provider document and share policies and procedures for configuration management and supply chain risk, which hold the rules for third-party and open-source software. CM-10 uses software in line with contracts and licences, and CM-10(01) restricts the use of open-source software. SR-04 documents and maintains the provenance of set components, which supports the list of dependencies. CM-14 blocks installation of set software unless its digital signature is verified against an approved certificate, and SR-11 detects and keeps out counterfeit components, which together check that software is genuine. SR-05(02) assesses components before they are selected or accepted, which covers the optional risk assessment of each product.

Gaps

C5 asks for third-party software to come from trusted sources. Name the approved sources in the policy and use them for every download.

DEV-15 Handling emergency changes and other exceptions safely

Rationale

CM-03 sets which types of change fall under change control, and reviews and approves each one with a security impact analysis. Its documented decisions and change records give a starting point for handling emergency changes and other exceptions.

Gaps

C5 asks for a set procedure for exceptions, emergency changes included, that keeps their risks in check. Add it to the CM-03 change process.

Mapped Controls

SSO-01 Rules for overseeing suppliers that help run the service

Rationale

SA-01 and SR-01 have the provider document and share policies and procedures for acquisition and supply chain risk, which hold the rules for service organisations. SR-06 assesses and reviews the supply chain risks of suppliers and contractors, and SA-09 requires external service providers to meet the provider's security requirements, defines oversight roles and monitors their compliance. SA-04 writes the security requirements and the split of responsibility into the acquisition contract, and SR-03(03) passes those controls down to subcontractors. SR-08 sets agreements with supply chain partners on notice of compromises and on the results of assessments or audits, which covers the optional independent audit reports.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to classify service organisations by risk and to decide which count as subservice organisations. Add both steps to the SR-06 assessment.

SSO-02 Assessing supplier risk before and during use

Rationale

SR-06 assesses and reviews, at a set frequency, the supply chain risks of suppliers and contractors and of what they provide, which covers the assessment of each service organisation and its regular review. RA-03 judges the likelihood and size of harm to the information a system handles, and RA-03(01) applies the assessment to supply chain risks, which covers protection needs and the impact of a breach.

Gaps

C5 asks the assessment to weigh dependence on the supplier and the risk of lock-in. It also asks about the complementary controls expected at subservice organisations, and the data that suppliers' own subcontractors handle. Add these topics to the SR-06 assessment.

Mapped Controls

SSO-03 Limiting supplier access to customer data

Rationale

AC-06 allows only the access each task needs, and AC-06(06) bars privileged access by users from outside the organisation, which keeps suppliers away from customer data. RA-03 judges the likelihood and size of harm from unauthorised access to or disclosure of information, which is the risk assessment needed before an exception. MA-05 has authorised, competent staff supervise the maintenance work of people who lack the required authorisations, which covers supervised supplier work.

Gaps

C5 asks for the customer's written authorisation before a service organisation processes its data, given per supplier or in advance for all. Add this to the customer contract.

Mapped Controls

SSO-04 A reviewed register of suppliers and their details

Rationale

SA-09 defines and documents the provider's oversight roles and responsibilities for each external service, which covers the responsible contacts. SA-09(05) addresses where external providers process and store data and run their services, which relates to the data locations in the register.

Gaps

C5 asks for a register of service organisations with details such as head office, jurisdiction, data locations, risk class, start of use and proof of compliance. Keep that register and review it at least once a year for completeness and accuracy.

Mapped Controls

SSO-05 Ongoing checks that suppliers meet their security duties

Rationale

SA-09 monitors the control compliance of external service providers on an ongoing basis, using methods the provider sets. SR-06 reviews supplier risks at a set frequency, which lets the monitoring follow each supplier's risk class, and SR-06(01) adds testing and analysis. SR-08 sets agreements with supply chain partners to receive notice of compromises and the results of assessments or audits, which brings in the reports to review. RA-07 responds to findings from assessments, monitoring and audits in line with risk tolerance, which covers the treatment of deviations.

Gaps

C5 asks for assurance that each subservice organisation runs the complementary controls the provider relies on. Add those checks to the SA-09 monitoring. When a change at a supplier significantly weakens the provider's security, tell all customers promptly.

SSO-06 Exit plans for suppliers the provider depends on heavily

Rationale

CP-02 develops a contingency plan that keeps essential functions going through a disruption, compromise or failure and assigns roles and responsibilities. CP-02(07) coordinates that plan with the plans of external service providers, which ties exit planning to the continuity plans.

Gaps

C5 asks for a documented exit strategy for each service the provider depends on very heavily. Cover the cost and timing of a move to another supplier, the roles and resources for it, success criteria and the indicators that would trigger withdrawal.

Mapped Controls

SSO-07 Telling customers which suppliers handle their data

Rationale

CA-03 approves and manages information exchanges with other systems through agreements. Each agreement documents the interface characteristics, security requirements, controls and responsibilities, and CA-03 reviews the agreements at a set frequency, which covers the data flows and interfaces with service organisations.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to tell customers which service organisations and subcontractors it uses and which types of data each one processes. Publish this list to customers and keep it current.

Mapped Controls

SSO-08 Approving each transfer between components and their vendors

Rationale

AC-01 and SR-01 have the provider document and share policies and procedures for access control and supply chain risk, which hold the rule on exchanges with suppliers. AC-04 enforces approved authorisations for information flows between the system and connected systems, so only approved flows pass between a component and its supplier. SC-07 connects to outside systems only through managed interfaces, which blocks direct links between components and their suppliers. AU-02 names the proposed operations, checks and transfers as events to log, and AU-12 generates the records that form the trace.

Gaps

C5 asks for approval of the content itself before every transfer to or from a component's supplier. Add a per-transfer approval step to the AC-04 flow rules.

SIM-01 How the provider prepares for and handles security incidents

Rationale

IR-01 has the provider document and share an incident response policy and procedures. IR-08 builds a response plan that sets the structure of the response capability, defines reportable incidents and assigns responsibility, which covers the response team and gives a starting point for classifying incidents. IR-04 handles incidents from preparation through detection and analysis to containment, eradication and recovery, and coordinates with contingency planning, and IR-04(12) adds forensic analysis for collecting evidence. IR-06 has staff report suspected incidents to the response capability within a set time, and sends incident information to authorities the provider defines.

Gaps

C5 asks for set channels to reach customers and for timely notice to those affected by an incident. Name the channels in the IR-08 plan, and add guidelines for classifying, prioritising and escalating incidents and for finding their root causes.

SIM-02 Approved plans for each stage of incident response

Rationale

IR-08 builds an incident response plan, has set roles review and approve it and sends it to response staff. IR-08 also updates the plan for system and organisational changes and communicates each change. IR-04 covers preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery, and feeds lessons learned back into procedures, training and testing, which are the stages the plans must address.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

SIM-03 Analysing incidents to their root cause and keeping evidence

Rationale

IR-04 covers detection and analysis and feeds lessons learned back, IR-04(04) correlates incident information, and IR-04(11) and IR-04(12) provide an integrated response team and forensic analysis. IR-08 defines reportable incidents, which gives the catalogue used to classify them, and IR-05 tracks and documents each incident. AU-09 protects audit information from unauthorised access, change and deletion, and AU-11 keeps audit records long enough for later investigation and for regulatory retention. IR-07(02) sets up coordination with external providers, which covers calling in outside help, and IR-03 tests the response capability at a set frequency, which covers the optional yearly exercises.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to choose outside incident responders for their competence and trustworthiness, or on a national cyber security authority's advice. Add those criteria to the IR-07 arrangements. Monitor the incident handling process itself and correct deviations promptly.

SIM-04 Sharing incident outcomes with affected customers

Rationale

IR-05 tracks and documents incidents, which records how each one was resolved. IR-08 has the response plan address the sharing of incident information, and IR-08(01) covers breaches. IR-06 sends incident information to authorities the provider defines.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to send each affected customer the documented solution for acknowledgement or confirmation. It also asks the contract to set which data customers receive for their own analysis of an incident. Add both to the IR-08 plan and the customer contract.

Mapped Controls

SIM-05 Making staff and partners report events to one central point

Rationale

IR-06 requires staff to report suspected incidents to the incident response capability within a set time. SR-08 sets agreements with supply chain partners to notify compromises, which places a reporting duty on business partners. AT-02 trains users, and AT-02(02) and AT-02(03) cover insider threat and social engineering, which helps staff recognise what to report. IR-07 provides a support resource that advises users on handling and reporting incidents, which makes the reporting route known.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to assure staff that false alarms are safe to report. Explain the reporting channels to customers and service organisations as well as to staff.

SIM-06 Learning from incidents through a knowledge base

Rationale

IR-05 tracks and documents incidents, and IR-05(01) automates their tracking, data collection and analysis, which builds the knowledge repository and measures incident types. IR-04 feeds lessons learned from incident handling into procedures, training and testing and puts the resulting changes in place. IR-06 reports incident information to set authorities, which covers reports to supporting bodies.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to use the knowledge repository to spot recurring incidents and to extend the incident classification catalogue. Add both uses to the IR-04 lessons learned process.

Mapped Controls

BCM-01 Running continuity management under a senior owner

Rationale

CP-01 has the provider document and share a contingency planning policy and procedures that address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities and management commitment, and names an official to manage them. CP-02 develops a contingency plan that identifies essential functions, sets recovery objectives, assigns roles and coordinates with incident handling, which covers the plans and their link to incident management.

Gaps

C5 asks for a continuity management system run to ISO 22301 or BSI 200-4. Name a member of top management as its process owner, with enough resources, and have leaders show visible support for it.

Mapped Controls

BCM-02 Assessing the impact of disruption on critical services

Rationale

CP-02 identifies essential functions and their contingency requirements and sets recovery objectives, restoration priorities and metrics, and CP-02(08) identifies critical assets. RA-03 identifies threats and vulnerabilities and judges the likelihood and size of harm, which supplies risk-based scenarios. RA-09 identifies critical system components and functions through a criticality analysis.

Gaps

C5 asks for a business impact analysis that sets the maximum tolerable downtime and estimates the resources needed to resume. It also maps dependencies on partners and third parties. Review the analysis at least once a year and after major changes.

Mapped Controls

BCM-03 Documented plans to keep the service running

Rationale

CP-02 develops a contingency plan with roles, responsibilities and contacts that keeps essential functions going and restores the system in full. It coordinates the plan with incident handling, has it approved and sends it to key staff, then reviews it at a set frequency and updates it for changes.

Gaps

C5 asks the plans to cover notice to customers and to stay consistent across all locations, zones and regions. Add both to the CP-02 plan.

Mapped Controls

BCM-04 Yearly continuity tests that include customers

Rationale

CP-04 tests the contingency plan at a set frequency, reviews the results and starts corrective action, and CP-04(01) coordinates the tests with the owners of related plans. CP-02 updates the plan for problems found in testing and feeds lessons learned into future testing and training.

Gaps

C5 asks for affected customers and relevant third parties to take part in the tests. Tell customers in advance about tests that could affect them, with the timing and an assessment of the likely impact, and review the alarm and notification plan after each exercise.

Mapped Controls

COM-01 Listing the requirements that apply and how they are met

Rationale

PM-01 develops a security programme plan that gives an overview of the programme's requirements and of the controls in place or planned to meet them. PL-02 builds a security plan for the system with an overview of its security requirements and a description of the controls that meet them, which records how the provider complies.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to name each legal, regulatory, self-imposed and contractual requirement and the procedure that meets it. Record these in the PL-02 plan, and give customers an overview of the procedures when they ask.

Mapped Controls

COM-02 A multi-year audit programme that protects the live service

Rationale

CA-01 has the provider document and share an assessment, authorisation and monitoring policy with procedures, which holds the audit rules. CA-02 selects assessors and develops an assessment plan with scope and procedures. PM-14 keeps plans for security testing and monitoring developed, carried out and reviewed against the risk strategy, which supports a programme over several years. CA-08 runs penetration tests at a set frequency, which covers intrusion tests of external access points, and SA-11(04) and SA-11(01) cover manual code review and static analysis of security features.

Gaps

C5 asks the audit rules to protect the running service: auditors get read-only access, and disruptive work runs in maintenance windows or outside peak hours. It also asks for audit activities to be logged and monitored. Add these rules to the CA-01 procedures, and grant customers information and audit rights in their contracts.

COM-03 Yearly impartial internal audits with risk-based follow-up

Rationale

CA-02 assesses controls at a set frequency to find whether they meet the security requirements, and CA-02(01) uses independent assessors, which supports impartial internal audits. RA-07 responds to findings from assessments and audits in line with risk tolerance, and CA-05 records and tracks the remediation of weaknesses found. CA-07 sets up continuous monitoring with ongoing assessments and metrics, and CA-07(06) adds automation, which covers the optional automatic monitoring and reporting of deviations.

Gaps

C5's optional criteria ask for interfaces that let customers check selected contract terms in real time. Offer them to customers if you adopt those criteria.

COM-04 Reporting security performance to top management

Rationale

PM-06 develops, monitors and reports on measures of security performance, which provides the metrics. PM-31 runs organisation-wide continuous monitoring with set metrics and reports the security status of systems to set roles at a set frequency, which keeps top management informed.

Gaps

C5 asks top management to review the ISMS at least once a year, using this performance information. Add that review, and yearly reports from business units on how well their policies and procedures work.

Mapped Controls

INQ-01 Legal review of government requests for data

Rationale

PT-02 determines and documents the authority that permits each kind of processing of personal data, and restricts processing to what that authority allows. For a request from a government agency, this calls for a recorded check of the legal basis before personal customer data is disclosed.

Gaps

C5 asks experts to make and document a legal assessment of every government request before any customer, derived or account data is accessed or disclosed, personal or otherwise. Add this step to the procedure for handling such requests.

Mapped Controls

INQ-02 Telling customers about government requests for their data
0%

Rationale

Gaps

SP 800-53 sets controls for protecting an organisation's own systems, and a duty to tell customers about government requests lies outside that scope. C5 asks the provider to inform affected customers promptly when an authority asks for their data, with exceptions where the law behind the request forbids it or there are clear signs of illegal use of the service. Add this notice to the procedure for government requests.

INQ-03 Giving agencies only the data a request covers

Rationale

AC-03 enforces approved authorisations for logical access, and AC-03(09) validates information before it is released, which keeps investigators to the data in scope. SI-19 removes set personal data elements from datasets, and SI-19(04) masks or replaces direct identifiers, which supports anonymising or pseudonymising data mixed with that of other customers. AU-06 reviews audit records for inappropriate or unusual activity, which covers the optional monitoring of what investigators do.

Gaps

Where the requested data is mixed with other customers' data, C5 asks for anonymisation or pseudonymisation so agencies can link it only to the customers named in the request. Apply this to every type of customer data, and correct promptly any deviation found while monitoring investigators.

Mapped Controls

INQ-04 Documenting for customers how data is disclosed to authorities
0%

Rationale

Gaps

SP 800-53 sets controls for protecting an organisation's own systems, and explaining disclosure practice to customers lies outside that scope. C5 asks for a document per service that sets out the disclosure process, the technical limits, the logging and how customers can review the logs, and the laws that govern notice to customers. Publish this document to customers and keep it current.

PSS-01 Guidance that helps customers configure and use the service securely

Rationale

SA-05 provides administrator documentation on secure configuration and operation and on the effective use of security functions. It also provides user documentation on the security functions, secure ways of using the system and the user's own security duties, and distributes both to set roles, which covers the guidance and the controls customers must run themselves.

Gaps

C5's optional criterion asks the provider to warn customers in good time about planned changes to the service, so they can prepare. Add that notice to the change process.

Mapped Controls

PSS-02 Finding vulnerabilities during development by testing and review

Rationale

SA-11 has the developer test the system and run a verifiable flaw remediation process, with SA-11(01) for static code analysis, SA-11(08) for dynamic code analysis and SA-11(04) for manual code reviews. RA-05 scans the system and hosted applications for vulnerabilities, including when new ones are reported, and fixes them in line with an assessment of risk, which covers flaws in third-party libraries. CA-08(01) uses an independent agent or team for penetration testing, which covers the optional yearly tests by outside experts.

Gaps

C5 asks for security checks driven by the software bill of materials. Add these checks to the RA-05 scanning.

Mapped Controls

PSS-03 Publishing known vulnerabilities and fixes to customers

Rationale

SI-05 receives security alerts and advisories from outside organisations, generates its own and shares them with set external organisations, which covers reading supplier advisories and informing customers. RA-05 uses standards to enumerate software flaws and measure their impact, and shares what vulnerability monitoring finds with set roles, which supports CVE references and CVSS scores. SI-02 identifies, reports and corrects flaws and installs security updates within a set time, and SI-02(05) adds automatic updates, which fits the optional update mechanism.

Gaps

C5 asks for advisories that sort vulnerabilities into known-exploited, patched and unfixed ones, with the reason a fix is withheld, and score them with CVSS and with EPSS, SSVC or a similar system. Check supplier vulnerability information at least daily, and use the CSAF format for advisories if you adopt the optional criterion.

Mapped Controls

PSS-04 Logs and error reports that customers can use and control

Rationale

AU-02 selects the event types to log and records why they are enough for later investigation, which ties logging to the identified risks. AU-03 makes each record show the type of event, when and where it happened, its source and outcome and who was involved. AU-12 generates the records and lets set roles choose which event types each component logs, and AU-09 protects audit information from unauthorised access, change and deletion. AU-16 coordinates audit information with external organisations when it crosses organisational boundaries, which supports delivering logs to a customer's SIEM. SI-11 produces error messages that support corrective action while keeping exploitable detail hidden.

Gaps

C5 asks for customers to be able to delete their own logs, and for logging of customer actions on the management plane to cover every relevant component. Build both into the logging design.

PSS-05 Multi-factor sign-in that customers can enforce

Rationale

IA-08 uniquely identifies and authenticates users and processes from outside the organisation, which covers the customers' users, components and applications at every access point. IA-02(01) and IA-02(02) add multi-factor authentication and IA-02(13) adds out-of-band authentication. IA-02 is written for the organisation's own users, so these enhancements apply to customer users by analogy.

Gaps

C5 asks for the service to let customers enforce multi-factor authentication for their own privileged users, components and applications. Offer that setting to customers.

Mapped Controls

PSS-06 Secure sessions that end after inactivity

Rationale

SC-23 protects the authenticity of communication sessions, and SC-23(01) and SC-23(03) invalidate session identifiers at logout and use unique identifiers generated by the system, which guards against hijacking and replay. AC-12 automatically ends a user session after set conditions, such as a period of inactivity.

Gaps

Mapped Controls

PSS-07 Password rules and tools the provider offers customers

Rationale

IA-05 verifies the recipient's identity when an authenticator is first issued and protects authenticator content, and IA-05(01) sets the rules for password-based authentication. AC-09(03) notifies users of changes to their account, such as a password reset. SA-05 gives users documentation on their security duties, which shares the password rules with customers. IA-08 authenticates users from outside the organisation, the customer users these rules protect.

Gaps

C5 limits an initial password to 14 days and a reset procedure to 48 hours. Set both limits in IA-05, and give customers tools to manage and enforce the password rules for their users.

PSS-08 Self-service roles and access rights for customer users

Rationale

AC-02 defines account types, group and role membership and the privileges of each account, and reviews accounts, which the service can offer so customers manage, list and review their users' rights. AC-03(07) enforces access through roles. AC-05 defines access authorisations that support separation of duties, and AC-06 allows only the access each task needs. These controls describe the provider's own accounts, so they apply to the customer functions by analogy.

Gaps

C5 asks for these functions as self-service features for customers. Offer customers tools to manage roles and to list and review their users' rights.

PSS-09 Checking every action against the user's permissions

Rationale

AC-03 enforces approved authorisations for logical access, and AC-03(13) adds attribute-based access control. AC-24 applies access control decisions to each access request before access is enforced. SA-11 tests new and changed functions at a set depth and coverage and corrects the flaws found, which validates the authorisation mechanisms before release. CM-04(02) checks after a change that the affected controls still work as intended.

Gaps

PSS-10 Keeping customer data confidential in virtual networks

Rationale

AC-04 enforces approved information flows within the system, and AC-04(21) separates flows by physical or logical means, which keeps customer traffic apart in software-defined networks. SC-07 monitors and controls traffic at managed interfaces, and SC-07(20) adds dynamic isolation and segregation. SA-11 tests new and changed features before release and corrects the flaws found, which covers validating SDN features.

Gaps

C5 asks for defects found in SDN features to be assessed and fixed in order of risk. Rank the SA-11 findings by risk before correcting them.

Mapped Controls

PSS-11 Hardened, traceable machine and container images

Rationale

CM-06 sets and applies the most restrictive configuration settings based on common secure configurations, which hardens the images the provider supplies. CM-07(05) lets only authorised software run, which supports limiting customer users to released images. SR-04 documents and maintains the provenance of components, which supports labelling images with their origin. CM-14 blocks installation of set components unless their digital signature is verified against an approved certificate. SI-07 detects unauthorised changes to software, with SI-07(09) verifying the boot process, which covers integrity checks at startup and during runtime.

Gaps

C5 asks the provider to tell customers what changed from the previous version of each image it supplies. Report the results of integrity checks to customers as well, as the optional criteria ask.

PSS-12 Keeping customer data in the regions the contract names

Rationale

CM-12 identifies and documents where set information is processed and stored and on which components, and records any change of location, which tracks the regions that hold customer data. SA-09(05) restricts where external providers process and store data and run their services, which keeps service organisations within the customer's chosen regions.

Gaps

C5 asks for an architecture that keeps customer data and its backups in the contracted regions. Set the regions and the terms for changing them in the contract, and tell customers before any change. For the optional partitions, keep identity management, privileged access, logging and key handling inside the chosen partition.

Mapped Controls

Methodology and Disclaimer

This coverage analysis maps from BSI C5:2026 clauses/requirements back to NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 controls, assessing how well the SP 800-53 control set addresses each framework requirement.

Coverage weighting represents an informed estimate based on control-objective alignment, not a definitive compliance determination. Weightings consider whether SP 800-53 controls address the intent of each framework requirement, even where terminology and structure differ.

This analysis should be validated by qualified assessors for use in compliance or audit activities. The authoritative source for any compliance determination is always the framework itself.